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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the popular yé-yé phenomenon and its role in articulating a vision of 
modern France in the aftermath of decolonization. Yé-yé, a teen-oriented and music-based 
popular culture that flourished from roughly 1962-1966, was in a unique position to define what 
it meant to be young in 1960s France. I argue that the yé-yé popular culture, through its 
definition of youth, provided an important cultural channel through which to articulate a modern 
French identity after the Algerian War (1954-1962). Using a combination of advertisements, 
articles, and sanitized depictions of teenage pop singers, the yé-yé popular culture constructed an 
idealized vision of adolescence that coupled a technologically-savvy and consumer-oriented 
outlook with a distinctly conservative, apolitical, and inclusive social stance. It reflected France’s 
reorientation toward a particular technological and consumer modernity while simultaneously 
serving to obscure France’s recent colonial past and the dubious legacy of imperialism.  
To contextualize yé-yé, this thesis begins by examining the blousons noirs (black jackets) 
and the societal anxieties that surrounded them in the early Fifth Republic (1958-1962). By 
tracking the abrupt shift from the blousons noirs to yé-yé in predominant media representations 
of youth, this thesis provides a unique vantage point with which to interpret dominant discourses 
of the Gaullist Fifth Republic and its attempt to reinvent France into a modernized and 
decolonized consumer republic. As the work suggests, it was not a coincidence that the 
optimistic yé-yé youth, unburdened by the tribulations of France’s recent past, appeared in full 
force within months following the recognition of Algerian independence in 1962.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 22, 1963, the commercial radio station Europe 1 invited young people from all 
over France to partake in a free outdoor concert held in the nation’s capital, Paris. The event 
celebrated the one-year anniversary of the popular teen-oriented music magazine, Salut les 
copains. The magazine’s founders, Daniel Filipacchi and Frank Ténot, hoped for a turnout of 
30,000 attendees. Instead, exceeding even their wildest expectations, some 150,000 young 
people crammed into the Place de la Nation, overflowing into adjoining streets. They came from 
all over, from nearby Parisian neighborhoods to far away provinces. Some of the fans, eagerly 
seeking a better view of the stage, climbed trees and scaled streetlamps in the square. The 
entertainment for the evening included France’s most popular young musical performers, 
including Sylvie Vartan, Frank Alamo, Richard Anthony, and the Chats Sauvages. Headlining, 
of course, was the ever-popular idole des jeunes, Johnny Hallyday. The “Night of the Nation,” as 
it was later called, quickly acquired mythic status; it was, up to that point, the largest concert in 
the history of popular music.1   
Writing subsequently in the daily newspaper Le Monde, the sociologist and public 
intellectual Edgar Morin offered an analysis of what manifested on that summer evening. For 
Morin, the concert displayed the emergence of a new classe d’âge defined by a common set of 
sensibilities, a distinct parlance, a collective worldview, and, perhaps most importantly, a shared 
sense of youth. What unified these teenagers, he noted, was a pervasive popular culture that had 
                                                 
1 Jacques Barsamian and François Jouffra, L’âge d’or du Yéyé: Le rock, le twist, et la variété française des 
années 60 (Paris: Éditions Ramsay, 1984), 141-142; David L. Looseley, Popular Music in Contemporary France: 
Authenticity, Politics, Debate (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 29.  
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already supplied them with a potent mixture of “myths, heroes, and models.”2 Drawing from the 
common vocal refrain “yeah, yeah” heard in many American songs from the period (of which the 
phonetic spelling in French was “yé, yé”), he termed the nascent phenomenon yé-yé. Morin 
argued that this popular culture, made possible by the rise of mass culture and mass 
communications, had created a “new adolescent class” that had implications for French society at 
large.3  
 This thesis focuses on the yé-yé phenomenon that gained widespread popularity in 1960s 
France. As Morin made clear, “youth” figured prominently as a discursive category in the mass 
media and among influential social scientists, educators, politicians, and social commentators. 
Given its ubiquity during the period, the yé-yé popular culture was in a unique position to define 
what it meant to be young in 1960s France. It was not the only discursive portrait of youth during 
the mid-1960s, but it was arguably the most visible. I argue that the yé-yé phenomenon, in its 
definition of adolescence, provided an important cultural channel through which to imagine and 
articulate a modern French identity in the Gaullist Fifth Republic. Through its marrying of a 
certain technological and consumer modernity with an apolitical and traditional social outlook, 
the idealized yé-yé teenager announced the arrival of a unified, prosperous, and forward-looking 
modern France unburdened by its recent past.  
This was in stark contrast to an earlier representation of youth, the blousons noirs (black 
jackets), which, when discussed in the media, evoked fears of working-class juvenile 
delinquency and “Americanization.” The wholesome yé-yé youth, as defined in the media, was 
                                                 
2 Edgar Morin, “Salut les copains: Une nouvelle classe d’âge,” Le Monde, July 6, 1963, 11. Unless 
otherwise noted, all translations from the original French are by the author.   
3 Edgar Morin, “Salut les copains: Le ‘yé-yé,’” Le Monde, July 7-8, 1963, 12. 
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created in part to assuage societal fears of the earlier blousons noirs. To track the abrupt shift 
from blousons noirs to yé-yé therefore offers a unique point of focus with which to chart 
France’s changing attitude regarding modernization and American-style mass consumerism in 
the wake of the Algerian War (1954-1962).  
 It is my contention that these discursive portraits of youth, the blousons noirs and the yé-
yé, can be read, and that, to do so is to shed light on the major anxieties and aspirations that 
defined a particular moment in French history.4 My main goals are twofold. First, I provide a 
much-needed historical contextualization of the yé-yé popular culture, from its origins in the era 
of the blousons noirs to its eventual end amid the student protests of May 1968, grounding its 
significance in larger changes during the period. Second, I aim to use yé-yé as a heretofore 
unlikely lens to investigate the way France navigated changing socio-cultural values and identity 
during modernization, decolonization, and the Cold War. By using this lens, I am able to 
interpret dominant discourses of the Gaullist Fifth Republic and to assess how many influential 
voices imagined France’s reinvention into a decolonized consumer republic.  
But what was yé-yé? It was foremost a popular culture, one made possible by the advent 
of mass society in the twentieth century.5 As a popular culture, yé-yé primarily entailed music 
                                                 
4 As my approach to this topic makes clear, I treat both the blousons noirs and yé-yé as phenomena that 
existed primarily in discourse. That is not to suggest that there were no teenagers who fit the description of the 
typical blousons noirs or copains of yé-yé. It was nevertheless the mass media that remained throughout the period 
the primary influence in defining youth. The question of how actual young people received (and possibly resisted or 
modified) this image is equally worthy of research. I do not possess the sources to permit me to address how 
teenagers responded to the media discourse that sought to speak on their behalf. As such, my focus remains on the 
dominant representations of youth deployed by advertisers, journalists, the music industry, and others.    
5 Mass society entailed the rise of mass communications (made possible by the rapid expansion of radio, 
film, print media, advertisements, and eventually television), mass culture (made possible by mass production and 
standardization), and mass consumption (implying the widespread availability of commodities and the general 
ability of the population to purchase them). On popular culture, see Raymond F. Betts with Lyz Bly, A History of 
Popular Culture: More of Everything, Faster and Brighter, 2nd Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013); on French 
popular culture, see Hugh Dauncey, ed., French Popular Culture: An Introduction (London: Arnold, 2003).   
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and music-related print media. It included innumerable musical performers, some enduring and 
many forgettable, who released new records at a dizzying pace. Its sounds and imagery were 
found on radio, television, and film. It spurred the creation of numerous periodicals and 
publications. At its height, yé-yé drew the attention of fashion designers and provided a 
marketing edge for a seemingly infinite number of commodities, from bubblegum and hairspray 
to turntables and automobiles. Its main propagators were savvy commercial interests, including 
record companies and publishing houses, and its most influential voices were journalists, 
advertisers, and, most importantly, the young singers. It was different from other prominent 
popular culture from the period – such as comic strips like Astérix or New Wave films like Les 
Quatre Cents Coups (The 400 Blows), for instance – in that it endeavored to be all-
encompassing, to speak on behalf of young people.6      
By critically analyzing the yé-yé phenomenon, this thesis hopes to contribute to the larger 
historiography on France’s postwar “modernization,” a term that is admittedly vague, even 
problematic, but which nevertheless provides a common framework through which to understand 
change in the decades following World War II.7 The roots of this modernization lay in the 
wartime experience of Nazi occupation and Vichy collaborationism; as the narrative goes, 
postwar leaders, desiring to look to the future rather than contemplate the recent past, rejected 
the political and economic institutions that had so clearly failed to protect France in its time of 
need and instead made deliberate efforts to transform the nation along economic, technological, 
                                                 
6 On Astérix, see Penelope E. Brown, A Critical History of French Children’s Literature: Volume Two, 
1830-Present (New York: Routledge, 2008); on New Wave cinema, see Richard Neupert, A History of the French 
New Wave Cinema, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007).    
7 For a critique of the term “modernization” as a framework for analysis, see Dean C. Tipps, 
“Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 15, no. 2 (Mar., 1973): 199-226.  
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political, and socio-cultural lines. A large body of literature points to the myriad changes in 
France from the 1940s to the 1960s.8 Some works, adopting the language of postwar technocrats, 
use modernization to interpret change during the period.9 Others address the topic more subtly, 
considering the process of postwar reinvention while leaving modernization in the background.10 
Taken together these works point to a postwar France that took deliberate and relatively swift 
actions to transform itself on economic and material levels and, perhaps simultaneously or as a 
consequence, on social and cultural levels as well.   
                                                 
8 Or, perhaps more precisely, the period from 1946 to 1975, what economist Jean Fourastié deemed the 
trente glorieuses (the “Thirty Glorious Years”). He dubbed it such because of the near 30-year span of unceasing 
and unprecedented economic growth during the period. Fourastié’s now-seminal 1979 publication, which inspected 
the drivers of economic growth and social change during the period (demographic growth, industrial and corporate 
investment, rising wages, and changing habits of consumption and leisure, among others), has since provided a 
familiar, if potentially problematic, periodization for subsequent scholars. See Jean Fourastié, Les trente glorieuses 
ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 (Paris: Fayard, 1979). Historians have recently begun to critically 
reconsider the period in numerous ways. For a recent critique of this periodization, see Rémy Pawin, “Retour sur les 
‘Trente Glorieuses’ et la périodisation du second XXe siècle,” Revue d’Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine 60, no. 1 
(Jan-Mar 2013): 155-175. For a look at the negative, oft-neglected aspects of France’s postwar economic growth, 
see Céline Pessis, Sezin Topçu, and Christophe Bonneuil, eds., Une autre histoire des « Trente Glorieuses »: 
Modernisation, contestations, et pollutions dans la France d’après-guerre (Paris: Découverte, 2013).        
9 Gabrielle Hecht points to the role of nuclear technology in reorienting national identity. See Gabrielle 
Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1998). Rosemary Wakeman examines the reinvention of Toulouse, from a decrepit provincial city into a 
modernized technological hub during the postwar period. See Rosemary Wakeman, Modernizing the Provincial 
City: Toulouse, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). For Steven Zdatny, modernization 
was felt through changing perceptions of cleanliness. See Steven Zdatny, “The French Hygiene Offensive of the 
1950s: A Critical Moment in the History of Manners,” Journal of Modern History 84, no. 4 (December 2012): 897-
932. Rebecca Pulju, meanwhile, provides a much needed analysis of women’s role, as consumers for the nation, in 
French modernization. See Rebecca J. Pulju, Women and Mass Consumer Society in Postwar France (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). Others frame French modernization in the context of Americanization and 
Franco-American relations. See for instance Christopher Endy, Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); and Brian Angus McKenzie, Remaking France: 
Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).    
10 The works that consider postwar French culture and intellectualism affirm the same societal impetus for 
change that color works on France’s various modernizing processes. Herman Lebovics for instance considers how 
President de Gaulle’s Minister of Culture, André Malraux, deployed France’s artistic legacy as a means to assert 
international prestige and foster national unity. See Herman Lebovics, Mona Lisa’s Escort: André Malraux and the 
Reinvention of French Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). Tamara Chaplin considers how in the 
postwar period, France, by televising its public philosophers, coupled its humanistic and intellectual traditions with 
its new modernizing tendencies to assert a new national identity. See Tamara Chaplin, Turning on the Mind: French 
Philosophers on Television (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).     
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One topic, however, remains conspicuously absent from the general narrative of France’s 
modernization: the Algerian War. Much of the work on modernization tends to downplay or 
ignore the central importance of decolonization and the Algerian War in understanding postwar 
France in general and the early Fifth Republic in particular. This remains true despite the 
conflict’s indelible impact on the era, including most obviously the suspect origins of the Fifth 
Republic in 1958. By contrast, I aim to integrate, to the extent possible, the war and its 
consequences into my interpretation of France’s process of reinvention along technocratic, 
corporate, and consumerist lines. In this attempt, Kristin Ross’ 1995 monograph Fast Cars, 
Clean Bodies looms large on my interpretation. Using an eclectic assortment of literary, film, 
intellectual, and periodical sources, Ross argues that between roughly 1955 and 1965, France 
underwent a cultural shift as a consequence of the twin processes of decolonization and 
modernization.11 It was at that specific historical juncture, she maintains, that an “interior 
colonialism” on the level of the everyday replaced the colonial project of old. In other words, 
precisely at the moment France relinquished imperial control over subject peoples, a system of 
advanced consumer capitalism imposed its control over the rhythms and practices of daily life. 
Treating “French modernization as an event,” Ross explores the process by which the logic of 
modernization integrated into everyday life and gave new meaning to the automobile, hygienic 
products, and the middle-class family unit.12 Reading her work raises the question: was a similar 
cultural logic regarding modernization reflected elsewhere? Influenced by Ross’ approach, my 
                                                 
11 Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture 
(Cambridge: MA: MIT Press, 1995). 
12 Ibid., 4.  
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research aims to assess the extent to which teen-oriented popular culture signaled the 
rationalization of a France transformed by economic and socio-cultural modernization.   
Interestingly, it was, according to Ross, the process of modernization that made it 
possible to envision a neat and orderly separation between metropolitan France and its former 
empire once colonialism “came to an abrupt end, cleanly, in 1962.”13 By tracking the sudden 
national interest in hygiene in the 1950s, Ross argues that it provided a metaphorical means to 
both “cleanse” and “purify” the nation following the Vichy collaborationism of World War II. 
She also finds that the same discourses of cleanliness – which encouraged household efficiency 
and strove to erase all stains – simultaneously operated to justify the systematized use of torture 
tactics in Algeria by erasing “the moral sense of trace (the mark of guilt, of wrongdoing).”14 
Through a provocative discursive analysis, Ross provides a framework to understand how the 
process of modernization served to erase, or at least subordinate, France’s colonial past. Building 
on this conclusion, albeit in a different domain, I consider how yé-yé, very much a product of 
France’s mass consumer modernity, contributed to a modernized France “cleansed” of its 
imperial legacy.   
Additionally, over the past two decades, the topic of “youth” has become increasingly 
commonplace in the historiography of modern France and Europe. Social historians have turned 
their attention to youth organizations and student protest.15 Others have considered the advent of 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 9.  
14 Ibid., 118.  
15 Some relevant examples of this approach include Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekelder, and Joachim Scharloth, 
eds., Between Prague Spring and French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960-1980 (New York: Berghahn, 
2011); Gerd Rainer-Horn, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); and, most recently, Robert Gildea, James Mark, Anette Warring, eds., Europe’s 
1968: Voice of Revolt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).   
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“youth culture,” often in a transnational or comparative setting.16 These works provide much-
needed agency to young people in the interpretation of socio-cultural and political change during 
the postwar era. More relevant to my research, historians have also begun to probe the socially-
constructed category of youth, whether in media representations or in societal discourse. These 
historians use the topic of “youth” as a means through which to investigate change during the 
postwar period and as a lens onto the many preoccupations, anxieties, and aspirations of the 
era.17 Susan Weiner, in her 2001 work Enfants Terribles, considers prominent media 
representations of young girls in postwar France and how they corresponded to a society seeking 
to define its national identity in the aftermath of World War II and amid national and 
international change.18 More recently, Richard Ivan Jobs, in the 2007 work Riding the New 
Wave, examines how postwar French society used the category of youth to envision national 
renewal during the Fourth Republic.19  
While the topics of youth and youth culture have become increasingly attractive areas of 
study, critical analyses of the yé-yé popular culture and its representation of youth, the copain, 
remain limited. Several French music journalists provide thorough accounts of the musical 
                                                 
16 See Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c. 
1958-1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and, more recently, the edited collection Axel Schildt and 
Detlef Siegfried, eds., Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980 
(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006). 
17 Numerous scholars have taken this approach in recent studies. See, for instance, Lindsay Sarah Krasnoff, 
“Goals and Dreams: The Quest to Create Elite Youth Athletes in France, 1958-92” (Phd diss., City University of 
New York, 2009); Gilian Glaes, “Gender and the French Ski Industry, 1946-1960,” in Proceedings of the Western 
Society for French History 37 (2009); and Sharon Elise Cline, “Feminité à la Française: Femininity, Social Change, 
and French National Identity, 1945-1970” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2008).      
18 Susan Weiner, Enfants Terribles: Youth and Femininity in the Mass Media in France, 1945-1968 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
19 Richard Ivan Jobs, Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World 
War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).   
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phenomenon.20 Within the French academy, historians, more focused on detailing the experience 
of actual young people from the period, tend to treat yé-yé as one of many factors that shaped the 
adolescent experience in the 1960s.21 Scholars like David Looseley analyze yé-yé to consider 
how Anglo-American musical styles gained cultural legitimacy within French popular music.22 
Chris Tinker has written much about yé-yé, but his focus remains largely confined to the most 
popular publication of the era, Salut les copains.23 Jonathyne Briggs, using a musicological 
approach, places yé-yé into a changing landscape of French popular music that he argues served 
to provide fleeting social solidarities in an otherwise changing and fragmenting postwar 
society.24 Providing a much-needed gender analysis of the popular culture, his more recent work 
considers how the female singers of yé-yé addressed prevailing gender and sexual norms through 
their music and appearance.25  
Unlike scholars like Looseley, who deemed yé-yé both “vacuous and embarrassingly 
inauthentic” as well as a “colonised music that eternally misses the point,” my interest is not to 
                                                 
20 See Barsamian and Jouffra, L’âge d’or du Yéyé; for a more general treatment, see Frédéric Quinonero, 
Les années 60: Rêves et Révolutions (Paris: Carpentier, 2009).  
21 See Anne-Marie Sohn, Age tendre et tête de bois: Histoire des jeunes des années 1960 (Paris: Hachette, 
2001); and Jean-François Sirinelli, Les baby-boomers: Une génération, 1945-1969 (Paris: Fayard, 2003).   
22 Looseley, Popular Music in Contemporary France.  
23 His research provides a discursive analysis of the magazine Salut les copains to shed light on the way it 
shaped the meaning of adolescence in 1960s and 1970s France, as well as how it influenced social norms. See Chris 
Tinker, “Shaping Youth in Salut les copains,” Modern and Contemporary France 15, no. 3 (August 2007): 293-308; 
and Chris Tinker, Mixed Messages: Youth Magazine Discourse and Sociocultural Shifts in Salut les copains (1962-
1976) (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010). 
24 Jonathyne Briggs, “Anarchie en France: Hypermodernity and French Popular Music, 1958-1981” (PhD 
diss., Emory University, 2006). A more recent work, published too recently to be used in this thesis, is Jonathyne 
Briggs, Sounds French: Globalization, Cultural Communities, and Pop Music in France, 1958-1980 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).   
25 In the article, Briggs argues that the “long sexual revolution” had a distinctly gendered dimension and 
that, unlike male performers who were able to use music to question and alter sexual norms, female performers 
needed to uphold conservative social mores. See Jonathyne Briggs, “Sex and the Girl’s Single: French Popular 
Music and the Long Sexual Revolution of the 1960s,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 21, no 3 (September 
2012): 523-547.   
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track the path American-influenced popular music took to cultural authenticity in France.26 It is 
true that yé-yé never received the critical praise of other genres and it remained, both during its 
span and after, the fodder of serious music critics. Acknowledging this, however, does little to 
explain why the popular culture was able to reach such popularity and resonate with so many. 
My research strives to assess the yé-yé’s significance beyond its musical contributions, seeing it 
as a cultural phenomenon attuned to its unique historical moment. Building on Kristen Ross’ 
research, this thesis suggests that the timing of yé-yé’s swift ascent, coming in the months 
following the end of the Algerian War, was not coincidental. The idealized yé-yé youth 
symbolized a generation, born after the Second World War and too young to be culpable for the 
atrocities committed during the Algerian War, untarnished by the recent past. It provided, as a 
vital signifier of youth, a convenient vessel with which to project the hopes and aspirations of a 
reinvented nation.    
My research relies on a number of primary sources drawn from the mass media of the 
period. They come from, to use Herrick Chapman’s phrase, the usual “alchemists of national 
identity”: journalists, writers, filmmakers, advertisers, celebrities, social scientists, educators, 
politicians, and other vocal social commentators.27 I have relied on some sources more heavily 
than others, depending on their availability. Mass-print magazines meant for teenagers, like the 
popular Salut les copains, form the backbone of my research, though they are supplemented and 
corroborated to the extent possible by a number of other sources including books, government 
pamphlets, films, newspapers, women’s and entertainment magazines, television programs, 
                                                 
26 Looseley, Popular Music in Contemporary France, 30.  
27 Chapman used this apt descriptor in a historiographical essay. See Herrick Chapman, “Modernity and 
National Identity in Postwar France,” French Historical Studies 22, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 302. 
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photographs, speeches, song lyrics, and album covers. In the popular teen-oriented magazines of 
the era, a startling number of articles, editorials, questionnaires, advertisements, and advice 
columns defined what it meant to be young in 1960s France.  
At the same time, famous teenage singers, or “teen idols” as they were called, who often 
served as the focus of the magazines, offered a mythic (and highly mediated) depiction of 
adolescence that encouraged emulation. Throughout this study, these stars’ attitudes, opinions, 
and actions, as well as their representation in the media, provide much of the evidence for my 
argument. Guided by a recent work on stardom in postwar France, I operate on the belief that 
“the ‘stars’ of a given historical period or moment capture their era for us in a range of ways: that 
the preoccupations, values, conflicts, and contradictions of a particular culture … are vividly 
expressed through its celebrities.”28 Admittedly, the voices captured here, whether journalists or 
teenage singers, did not necessarily reflect the whole of France. They were nevertheless in the 
privileged position to offer their interpretation of the country’s system of values, its cultural 
priorities and imperatives, and its identity. In doing so, they provided a particular vision that both 
constructed and reflected larger societal desires prevalent in the Gaullist Fifth Republic.     
This thesis captures France at a significant moment in history, one shaped by wars of 
decolonization, concerted social and economic change, and an international political climate 
tempered by the Cold War and America’s dominant position in the West. At the forefront was 
the Algerian War, which, since 1954, had embroiled France in a bloody fight to quell Algerian 
                                                 
28 John Gaffney and Diana Holmes, “Introduction” in John Gaffney and Diana Holmes, eds., Stardom in 
Postwar France (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 1.   
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nationalism and preserve the centerpiece of its colonial empire.29 It was a “dirty war,” one that 
saw the French army’s widespread use of torture and terror tactics, exposing the moral 
bankruptcy of France’s fabled Civilizing Mission. At the same time, it was a “war without a 
name,” to use John Talbott’s phrase, as an entire cloud of obfuscation formed to deny the French 
public a clear portrait of the war.30 A number of euphemisms – alternating between the Algerian 
“problem,” the Algerian “dispute,” or, most commonly, the Algerian “events” – emerged to 
define the conflict; in official propaganda, meanwhile, the soldiers’ mission was not one of 
warfare, but rather “pacification.”31 In the final years of the bitter conflict, violence and terrorism 
became increasingly common on both sides of the Mediterranean. Within months of the war’s 
conclusion in 1962, some 900,000 European settlers, fearing retribution, fled the newly 
independent Algeria, most settling in France, a “homeland” they had never known. Meanwhile, 
for a generation of young recruits, over two million in all, the conflict, which implicated them in 
acts of torture and abuse, signaled the loss of both youth and innocence.32 
By 1958, the political situation had deteriorated to the extent that the feeble Fourth 
Republic (1946-1958) had lost support of Algeria’s white settler population. It had also lost 
authority over the French military, which threatened to topple the government and install a leader 
                                                 
29 More than a centerpiece, it was, legally at least, an official part of metropolitan France. Algerian became 
a French colony in 1830. Unlike most colonies, it was governed as part of France, divided into three administrative 
départements, and answerable to the French Ministry of the Interior. Additionally, it was set apart from many other 
French colonial possessions by its sizeable European settler population – roughly a million at the outbreak of war in 
1954. For a general overview of French Algeria, see Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History, trans. 
Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).    
30 John Talbott, The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: Knopf, 1980).   
 31 Philip Dine, "A la recherche du soldat perdu: Myth, Metaphor, and Memory in the French Cinema of the 
Algerian War," in Valerie Holman and Debra Kelly, eds., France at War in the Twentieth Century: Propaganda, 
Myth, and Metaphor (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000), 144-145.   
32 On the loss of innocence, see the chapter “Implication: Faire la guerre,” in Ludivine Bantigny, Le plus 
bel âge? Jeunes et jeunesse en France de l’aube des « Trente Glorieuses » à la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Fayard, 
2007), 342-379.  
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of its choosing rather than suffer another humiliating loss (following World War II, the 
Indochina War, and the Suez Crisis) at the hands of irresolute politicians. A divided France, 
under threat of military coup and possible civil war, turned to the hero of World War II, Charles 
de Gaulle, who, in the moment of crisis, appeared to be the lone figure capable of appeasing both 
the populace and the military, while also bringing resolution to the Algerian War.33 His return 
spelled the death knell of the Fourth Republic, and, with it, the founding of the Fifth Republic. 
The tone of government underwent an important change in this shift from the Fourth to the Fifth 
Republics; if the National Assembly and its numerous, fractious party rivalries dominated 
political life in the Fourth Republic, the early Fifth Republic’s focus centered on the powerful 
executive branch. When coupled with resounding electoral success for the Gaullists in the 
National Assembly, this new political dynamic allowed de Gaulle and his paternalistic brand of 
conservatism to dominate political (and social) discourse for the better part of a decade.34  
As the country confronted the loss of its empire, many vocal critics claimed that France 
faced a veritable “colonization” of its own thanks to the influx of American cultural products, 
business investment, and tourists (to say nothing of the United States’ political and military 
influence at the height of the Cold War). It exacerbated existing fears about France’s loss of 
prestige and its declining influence on the world stage.35  
                                                 
33 For a general history of the Fourth Republic, see Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958, 
trans. Godfrey Rodgers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).  
34 For a basic overview, see Serge Bernstein, The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969, trans. Peter Morris 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
35 On the complex meaning of Americanization in postwar France, see Richard Kuisel, Seducing the 
French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkley: University of California Press, 1993); and Ross, Fast Cars, 
Clean Bodies.  
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Chapter one, by focusing on the era of the blousons noirs, seeks to frame societal concern 
about juvenile delinquency in relation to a larger historical context. During the early Fifth 
Republic, from roughly 1958 to 1962, the blousons noirs captured the attention of both popular 
and academic writers. A pejorative term from the start, it conjured images, often drawn from 
American teen cinema, of young troublemakers outfitted in black leather jackets and blue jeans. 
Observers routinely attached a working-class label to the blousons noirs. In one sense, “working 
class” referred to the marginalized socio-economic background of the young delinquents. More 
often than not, though, the label was purely perceptional, whereby “working-class culture” 
suggested something subversive, foreign, and perennially at odds with the dominant culture, 
particularly as it applied to the perceived corruption of middle-class youths. I argue that the 
sudden spike in national concern over juvenile delinquency must be historicized. As the chapter 
demonstrates, discussion about the working-class blousons noirs, as part of a larger debate about 
juvenile delinquency, frequently corresponded to societal ambivalence about a changing nation 
beset by the Algerian War, modernization, and Americanization.   
By the mid-1960s, with the collapse of the French Empire, the Gaullist state searched for 
new means to express national identity and to recoup national self-esteem. Industrial and 
technological modernization, which France’s political and technocratic elite had pursued since 
the end of World War II, took on new importance, becoming a key element in the reassertion and 
re-articulation of French prestige.36 At the same time, the rise of American-style mass 
                                                 
36 Modernization is a recurrent theme throughout this thesis. This research does not mean to suggest that, 
following the collapse of empire, modernization somehow supplanted colonialism. This thesis does suggest that the 
idea of a modernized France, as a source of both national self-confidence and international influence, assumed new 
symbolic importance toward the end of empire, particularly as it coincided with the need to prepare the nation for 
increased European economic integration. Modernization was a process that occurred simultaneous to the wars of 
decolonization and started at the end of World War II (some historians would suggest even earlier). An umbrella 
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consumerism no longer provoked insecurity. Instead, when coupled with de Gaulle’s brand of 
nationalism, it became a measure of the ever-increasing living standard of French citizens and of 
the economic vitality of the new French Republic. The “modern” France of the mid-1960s thus 
projected the image of a unified, forward-looking, and confident nation. The recent past, whether 
the near civil war of World War II or the Algerian quagmire, was forgotten.  
Together, chapters two and three consider the ways in which the yé-yé popular culture 
contributed to the society-wide acceptance of a particular definition of “modern” France. Chapter 
two explores how the popular culture advanced an image of adolescence that corresponded to the 
broad national imperatives of modernization. In doing so, it shed the supposedly working-class 
connotations of the blousons noirs by placing yé-yé squarely within the value system of the 
newly urban, educated, and technocratic middle class of the era. The chapter also considers how 
the popular culture served to envision a new France fully disentangled from its colonial legacy. 
Chapter three examines the way that the yé-yé popular culture integrated an ideology of mass 
                                                 
term, it applied to any number of phenomena, including financial and business reform, the directed growth of 
industrial and technological sectors, the improvement of infrastructure and transportation networks, and the 
implementation of both Fordist production and Taylorist managerial strategies. It also spelled an expansion of higher 
and technical education, the growth of mass consumer society (evidenced in new advertising models, new modes of 
distribution, like supermarkets, and new commodities), and increased urbanization. At the state level, it meant 
proactive interventionist policies (dirigisme) and far-reaching economic planning meant to expedite economic 
growth and improve the economic competitiveness of French business. Economic planners like Jean Monnet 
spearheaded the modernization drive, and during the Fourth and early Fifth Republics, technocrats and specialists of 
all stripes wielded tremendous influence in matters of state policy-making. As a source of prestige, French 
technological projects, like nuclear energy (and the atomic bomb) and the Concorde supersonic jetliner, provided 
potent symbols. Some works on the modernization of French business, industry, and finance, particularly as they 
relate to international change, include Michael Loriaux, France after Hegemony: International Change and 
Financial Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Marie-Laure Djelic, Exporting the American 
Model: The Postwar Transformation of European Business (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For a longer 
view, see Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in 
the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Some suggest that modernization was only 
made possible by an existing foundation laid gradually over the preceding century. See, for instance, Michael 
Stephen Smith, The Emergence of Modern Business Enterprise in France, 1800-1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006).        
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consumerism into the fabric of everyday life.37 Looking at two practical (and gendered) 
examples – the automobile and ready-to-wear fashion – the chapter studies how both consumer 
commodities became central to the definition of modern adolescence and how notions of taste, 
success, happiness, and, ultimately, national identity were reoriented in the process.  
As chapters two and three suggest, the yé-yé popular culture articulated a vision of youth 
that was unifying, conservative, and stable. In many ways, though, its image of stability masked 
a rapidly changing society. Particularly among a generation of postwar youths, rising affluence 
and increasing independence led to a liberalization of attitudes towards sexuality. Chapter four 
considers the construction of femininity in the yé-yé phenomenon. As the chapter argues, against 
the backdrop of an emergent sexual revolution, the yé-yé popular culture attempted to manage 
changing attitudes and social mores by affirming the primacy of a femininity grounded in the 
traditional framework of marriage, motherhood, and domesticity.  
                                                 
37 For clarification, it is necessary to differentiate “consumer society” from “mass consumer society.” The 
former is generally understood to have emerged in the West during the latter half of the nineteenth century. It 
implied a society where commodities and consumer goods were available on an unprecedented level but 
nevertheless remained the preserve of a bourgeoisie whose consumption habits served as a means of distinction 
from lower classes. Consumer society was directly related to increased productive capabilities made possible by the 
Industrial Revolution, though many of the core features remained in their infancy. By contrast, mass consumer 
society implied an even higher diversity of goods and, with it, a democratization of consumption where commodities 
were, at least in theory, available to all. Mass consumer society was made possible by the increased sophistication of 
mass production (Fordism and Taylorism, as well as greatly improved means of distribution) and marketing. 
Certainly, France was no stranger to consumerism; it was at the forefront of changing consumer habits in the 19th 
century. The twentieth century shift towards mass consumer society in Europe has frequently been viewed within 
the context of Americanization, particularly in the period after World War II. On the role of “consumer society” in 
France during the nineteenth century as it applied to bourgeois identity formation, see Rosalind H. Williams, Dream 
Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France (Berkley: University of California Press, 1982); 
Lisa Tiersten, Marianne in the Market: Envisioning Consumer Society in Fin-de-Siècle France (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 2001); and Michael P. Miller, The Bon Marché: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 
1869-1920 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). For the 20th century move towards a more 
“democratic” or “American” form of consumption see Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance 
through 20th-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); and Harm G. 
Schröter, Americanization of the European Economy: A Compact Survey of American Economic Influence in Europe 
since the 1880s (Norwell, MA: Springer, 2005). For a critical consideration of the two systems in a larger debate 
about the study of consumption, see Frank Trentmann, “Beyond Consumerism: New Historical Perspectives on 
Consumption,” Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 3 (Jul., 2004): 373-401.  
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Finally, the epilogue tracks the demise of the once-popular yé-yé phenomenon in the late 
1960s. It explains why the copain construct of youth that once resonated no longer matched the 
attitudes and aspirations of French youth. Each of the chapters, in one way or another, addresses 
what many wanted France to be or to become. In most cases, they represented societal aspiration 
over reality. They nevertheless tell us something about how influential voices within French 
society sought to define both youth and nation in 1960s France.  
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CHAPTER 1: DEFINING TEENAGE CONSUMPTION IN THE ERA OF 
THE BLOUSONS NOIRS, 1958-1962 
On a cool evening in late February 1961, a strange spectacle began to materialize on the 
outskirts of Paris. Along the outer limits of the Fifteenth Arrondissement, roughly five thousand 
teenagers gathered, waiting impatiently for the night to commence. For onlookers, the sight was 
disconcerting: a horde of young people, the majority of which were males, outfitted in 
questionable attire and looking ominous. Many of the young men wore blue jeans, leather 
jackets, and ruffled caps – the attire linked to the blousons noirs in the preceding years. Their site 
of congregation was the Palais des Sports, a fitting location for the event. The venue, a futuristic 
structure built the year prior, offered an ideal setting for a phenomenon without precedent: the 
first rock and roll festival on French soil. Rowdy teenagers flooded the stadium, intent on 
hearing some of the most celebrated names in French rock and roll play loud and raucous music. 
The list of performers included, among others, Frankie Jordan, the Chaussettes Noires, and 
Johnny Hallyday. The festival proved fertile ground for controversy. By the end of the evening, a 
number of brawls ensued and approximately fifty stadium chairs were ripped from the floor. At 
one point during the concert, the police needed to intervene to bolster stadium security. When it 
was all said and done, a handful of teenagers ended up in the hospital as a result of the unruly 
crowd.1  
Michèle Manceaux, a journalist for the weekly news magazine L’Express, covered the 
concert. Her article recounted the evening in lurid detail. She spoke for many who remained 
ambivalent about the uncertain trends attracting French youth and who worried about the 
                                                 
1 Christian Victor and Julien Regoli, Vingt ans de rock français (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978), 24.   
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implications for France’s future. Upon witnessing the incomprehensible music and the 
inexplicable rituals of the audience, she wondered “what savage tribe could celebrate a cult as 
pagan, as vacuous” as the spectacle that befell the Palais des Sports.2 “Nevertheless,” she 
concluded despite her disbelief, “this is really Paris, and this is French youth.”3 In the following 
weeks, dismayed readers wrote to L’Express to voice their disapproval of Manceaux’s 
assessment of French youth. Many took issue with Manceaux’s conclusion that the apparent 
debauchery of the evening reflected the “true” youth of France. As one reader wrote: 
No, madam, this is not Paris and still less the French youth, it is the underbelly 
of the French youth and one must not confuse the two. The true French youth 
– one doesn’t find them at the Palais des Sports shouting and swaying, 
intentionally dressed in an idiotic and extravagant way (without knowing 
why). No … one finds the true French youth in schools, workshops, factories, 
colleges, and also … in Algeria.4   
The reader’s impassioned letter, in its effort to disassociate the image of France’s youth from 
supposed unsavory elements in attendance at the Palais des Sports, echoed a larger societal 
preoccupation in the early years of the French Fifth Republic.  
The rise of rock and roll in France occurred at an important junction in the nation’s 
history. Political change, marked most obviously by the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958, 
accompanied the dramatic, and often difficult, processes of modernization and decolonization. 
As the country attempted to navigate these transformations, it faced the ever-present economic, 
cultural, and political influence of the United States within the Cold War. In the early Fifth 
Republic, anxieties about uncertain social and cultural change, voiced by a diversity of 
                                                 
2 Michèle Manceaux, “Le grand gala,” L’Express, March 2, 1961, 27.  
3 Ibid., 27. Emphasis added.  
4 J.-C. Burot, “La vraie jeunesse française,” L’Express, March 16, 1961, 2.  
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commentators, were often channeled into discussions about the blousons noirs as part of a larger 
dialogue regarding juvenile delinquency. In particular, social commentators – both academic and 
popular writers – used the blousons noirs as a vehicle to question the societal impact of France’s 
thrust towards modernization and its simultaneous war in Algeria. At the same time, the image of 
the blousons noirs – working-class gangs of teenagers who consumed American popular culture 
– provided fodder for critics to lament the cultural and economic influence of the United States 
and to fret France’s drift toward American-style mass consumer society.   
The Blousons Noirs and Juvenile Delinquency in the Early Fifth Republic  
By the end of the 1950s, the French public was swept up in an intense, if ultimately short-
lived, furor over the blousons noirs. Over a span of nearly 10 years, from roughly 1957 to 1965, 
writers of all persuasions devoted countless pages to them in everything from entertainment 
magazines to social-scientific studies.5 During the period, brooding teenage males could be 
spotted loitering around Paris cinemas, cafés, and metro stations. In the public imagination, they 
were working-class gangs of young men (joined by the occasional wayward adolescent female) 
outfitted in blue jeans, boots, leather jackets, t-shirts, and slick pompadour hairstyles. The 
summer of 1959 marked the height of the controversy over the blousons noirs. The media 
declared it the “summer of the blousons noirs” following an uptick of public disturbances and 
hooliganism in which Paris police apprehended over five hundred adolescents for a variety of 
                                                 
5 Police reports and newspapers began to make reference to teenage gangs in France as early as 1957. Over 
the next several years, the fixation on the blousons noirs reached its height. By 1965, mention of them had 
practically ceased and, even then, the public’s interest had already begun to wane several years prior. See Françoise 
Tétard, “Le phénomène “blousons noirs” en France fin des années 1950-début des années 1960,” in Fabienne 
Gambrelle and Michel Trebitsch, eds., Revolte et société: Actes du IVe Colloque d’histoire au présent, Mai 1988 
(Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 296.      
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minor offenses. The climax came on July 22, 1959, when two rival gangs clashed in the Square 
Saint-Lambert in the Fifteenth Arrondissement of the French capital. Beyond ruining the square’s 
topiary and seating, the scuffle caused little serious damage. It nevertheless culminated in 
twenty-seven arrests and an official response from the Paris Prefect of Police, Maurice Papon.6  
The mass media played a pivotal role in exaggerating and sensationalizing fears about the 
teenage gang culture sweeping across France. Newspapers and magazines promptly seized 
opportunities to inflate veritable, if nevertheless minor, instances of hooliganism into larger 
alarm about the blousons noirs. Some journalists went so far as to persuade adolescents outfitted 
in leather jackets to stage mock scuffles for the benefit of newspaper photographs. In other 
instances, news journals, faced with the legal dilemma of showcasing pictures of minors in print 
media, simply pulled images from American films like Rebel without a Cause to supplement 
their stories about teenage delinquent gangs.7 These measures served to distort and exaggerate 
facts in order to create perceptions of juvenile delinquency among French youth. Nevertheless, a 
slew of works by public intellectuals and social scientists appeared simultaneously. Echoing 
similar concern, if under the guise of scientific and educational expertise, these publications lent 
the debate over the blousons noirs an air of much-needed credibility.8 
                                                 
6 Rosemary Wakeman, The Heroic City: Paris, 1945-1958 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 
265-266; Emile Copfermann, La génération des blousons noirs: Problèmes de la jeunesse française (Paris: 
Découverte, 2003; originally published in 1962), 23.    
7  Ludivine Bantigny, Le plus bel âge? Jeunes et jeunesse en France de l’aube des « Trente Glorieuses » à 
la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 126-127. 
8 This is hardly surprising though, as expert knowledge had long played an important role in 
conceptualizing juvenile delinquency as a social ill. On this, see Aurore François and David Niget, “Fabricating 
Risk…Sketching the History of Expert Power,” in Aurore François, Veerle Massin, and David Niget, eds., Expertise 
and Juvenile Violence: 19th-21st Century (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2011), 9-
18.  
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France’s fixation on juvenile delinquency in the 1950s mirrored, and in many ways was 
informed by, similar trends in other industrialized nations.9 Despite the heightened interest, 
though, the issue of juvenile delinquency was hardly new. As Sarah Fishman notes, from the 
early nineteenth century onward, France developed an evolving juvenile justice system and legal 
framework for minors that corresponded to changing understandings of childhood, crime, 
degeneracy, and recuperation.10 In the immediate postwar period, the same impulses that guided 
earlier efforts colored initiatives to reeducate so-called degenerate youths. Fears about the 
deleterious effects of World War II and the German occupation of France motivated reform of 
the juvenile justice system that prioritized rehabilitation over punishment in the face of rising 
instances of youth criminality.11 From the early nineteenth century to the postwar period, 
juvenile delinquency and the future of France’s youth was a recurring problem, one that had 
particular resonance during times of perceived crisis and change.  
In the public imagination, cities had long been the sites of most cases of juvenile 
delinquency and adolescent criminality.12 The perception in the late 1950s was no different, as 
                                                 
9 In the United States, for instance, observers grappled with the perceived dilemmas of juvenile 
delinquency earlier in the 1950s. Many Americans debated the suspect influence of postwar mass culture, on display 
in films, television shows, and comic books, on their nation’s youth. Meanwhile, as in France, commentators in both 
East and West Germany observed an apparent rise in juvenile delinquency marked by inner-city teenage riots and 
the spread of “working class” fashions derived from American teen cinema. On debates about juvenile delinquency 
in 1950s America, see James Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America’s Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 
1950s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). For the two Germanys, see Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: 
Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001), 76-
84.    
10 For an overview of the evolution of the juvenile justice system and juvenile delinquency, see the chapter 
“From Child Criminals to Juvenile Delinquents, 1810-1939,” in Sarah Fishman, The Battle for Children: World War 
II, Youth Crime, and Juvenile Justice in Twentieth-Century France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2002), 11-44.  
11 Richard Ivan Jobs, Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World 
War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 141-148.  
12 See Louis Chevalier, Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century, trans. Frank Jellinek (New York: H. Fertig, 1973).    
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the blousons noirs were conceived primarily as an urban phenomenon. At the same time, it was 
cities where the societal effects of the Algerian War were most visible. The burst of anxiety over 
the blousons noirs coincided with the height of war-related violence in Paris and elsewhere. 
While violence had long been an instrument of colonial rule, metropolitan France had been 
largely spared the instances of brutality employed in territories abroad. Even with the Algerian 
War, raging since 1954, the mainland remained mostly unscathed. This situation changed from 
1958 onward, as bloody clashes between French forces and Algerian nationalists spilled over 
into France’s largest cities.13 The climax of violence came on October 17, 1961, when police 
officers brutally dispersed a peaceful public demonstration of Algerians, killing scores of 
demonstrators. The police murdered an estimated two hundred persons, many in the heart of 
Paris, on the night of the demonstration and in the days following.14  
Additionally, as the war crawled toward an eventual denouement, French cities became 
hotspots for terrorist acts carried out by the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS), a fascist 
paramilitary group comprised of disgruntled military leaders, colonists, and far-right politicians 
intent on preserving, through all means necessary, French Algeria. The group, formed in 1961, 
                                                 
13 Following a period of mounting police violence towards Algerians settled in France, the leading Algerian 
nationalist movement, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), responded with a series of counterattacks, including 
the bombing of petrochemical plants and the killing of police in the nation’s capital. The Paris Police, led by Chief 
Maurice Papon, who had honed his harsh tactics during an earlier term as Prefect of the Algerian department 
Constantine, responded with swift reprisals, including raids, extrajudicial internment, and torture, which targeted the 
entire Algerian population in the city’s environs. The FLN answered the rising instances of torture and 
disappearances by further attacking police; between August and October 1961, eleven officers were killed. The Paris 
police, including riot police and other auxiliary forces, exhibited their vehement anger in the aftermath on the 
evening of October 17, 1961. On the rise of Algerian War-related violence in the metropole, see Jean-Luc Einaudi, 
“Crime: Colonial Violence in the Metropole (1954-1961),” in Pascal Blanchard, Sandrine Lemaire, Nicolas Bancel, 
and Dominic Thomas, eds., Colonial Culture in France since the Revolution, trans. Alexis Pernsteiner 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 380-387.   
14 On this event, see Jim House and Neil MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).   
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directed attacks and assassination attempts toward anyone perceived to be supportive of Algerian 
independence. The OAS targeted public figures like the intellectual Jean-Paul Sartre and de 
Gaulle’s Minster of Culture, André Malraux. Even the French President was the subject of 
repeated assassination attempts. As French relinquishment of Algeria became increasingly likely, 
the organization dialed up its attacks. Its choice instruments of terror were plastic explosives; 
over the span of two weeks in late January 1962, the OAS carried out forty-eight bombings in 
Paris alone.15    
Few public voices wanted to acknowledge the effects of this highly visible, war-related 
violence on France’s youth. Possibly fearful of the strict censorship in effect during the conflict, 
there remained a conspicuous silence on the potential relationship between the “dirty war” and 
juvenile delinquency.16 Writing after the conflict in 1962, Emile Copfermann, an influential 
social commentator interested in matters of youth development, made the impact clear. He 
recognized that the blousons noirs, who possessed “nothing very original” by way of attire and 
origin, were nevertheless exposed to a climate markedly different from their counterparts in other 
Western countries. He proceeded to describe a youth colored by “seven years of the Algerian 
War, murders, [and] daily assassinations.”17 Later in his analysis, Copfermann pondered the 
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effect of the conflict on returning soldiers. He feared that it had corrupted a generation of youths. 
“The riots of the blousons noirs posed the question of juvenile delinquency,” he wrote, 
concluding that these “cases of disobedience called attention to the reality of the war five years 
after the opening of hostilities.”18 The war, he found, had led to a “deterioration of the ethical 
climate” and a “deprivation of morals” among a generation of young combatants. Copfermann, 
in his reflection on the war, remained an outlier, as few specialists proved willing to prompt 
reflection on the conflict’s toll on French youth.    
France’s cities, ravaged by war-related violence and terrorism, also lent a striking 
visibility to the concerted, if often uneven, national efforts to modernize. In this respect, nothing 
symbolized the country’s technocratic modernizing aspirations better than the project of urban 
construction that brought new, if not always improved, changes to cities and urban areas. The 
blousons noirs, and the topic of juvenile delinquency in general, quickly became entangled in 
this larger process of reconstruction. As Rosemary Wakeman notes, the imagery of young 
hooligans occupying Parisian streets became a symbol of a larger breakdown of urban space 
amid France’s effort to swiftly urbanize.19 The reconstitution of urban space referred in particular 
to the sweeping construction of publicly-funded housing complexes, many of which were the 
rent-controlled apartments known as Habitations à Loyer Modéré (HLM). Leaving 1 in 20 
buildings destroyed and a fifth of all buildings damaged, World War II provided the initial 
impetus for reconstruction. Over the course of the 1950s, economic change, accompanied by 
urbanization, prompted a further housing drive.20 At the beginning of the Second World War, 
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France represented the most rural nation in Europe, with almost half of its population living in 
small communes and a fourth of its workforce employed in agriculture. With the development of 
new industries and, with them, new employment opportunities, French families increasingly left 
rural villages in search of work in urban areas. At its height in the 1960s, this “rural exodus” 
drove some 100,000 workers per year from the soil to the cities.21  
In an effort to accommodate the housing crisis and the migratory patterns accompanying 
economic growth, the French state implemented a number of plans and programs aimed at the 
construction of ample and affordable urban housing.22 Despite a slow start, the basic goal was 
successful; between public and private efforts, there were some 300,000 new housing units 
produced per year by the early 1960s. The final result, however, was often a question of quantity 
at the expense of quality, leading to the creation of the grands ensembles – large, imposing 
blocks of concrete apartment buildings situated on the outer limits of French cities. Many of the 
units were often drab, offering their inhabitants few comforts. Compounding the problem, the 
apartments, often built along the outskirts of urban areas, regularly lacked sufficient access to 
parks, shopping centers, and other spaces for leisure and recreation. Poor transportation options 
made searching for and commuting to work equally frustrating.23  
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These vast complexes became linked to juvenile delinquency in the early Fifth Republic, 
as the image of bored and restless blousons noirs loitering outside of barren apartment buildings 
became a useful metaphor for the dreary existence associated with the grands ensembles. At the 
time, a class of experts on the subject readily confirmed that the social atmosphere created by 
these structures fueled the formation of teenage gangs. Located in the Paris suburb of 
Vaucresson, the Centre de Formation et de Recherche de l’Education Surveillée, a research 
facility borne out of the social-scientific and technocratic impulses of the 1950s, affected a 
massive study on the topic of gang formation in the summer of 1960. The center found that, 
more than any other single factor (including scholastic and professional milieus), the quality of 
the neighborhood contributed to the creation of youth gangs. The researchers noted that the HLM 
housing complexes provided the most favorable conditions for juvenile delinquency. The reasons 
were numerous. They pointed to the high population density, the cramped living conditions, and 
the lack of recreational areas, noting that gang-related juvenile delinquency was highest among 
adolescents “for which the street is the only source of relaxation.”24   
The perceived association between the grands ensembles and the blousons noirs was not 
limited to researchers. The links also permeated into popular culture. A 1960 film captured the 
public perception on the issue. Directed by Marcel Carné, an aging filmmaker in the twilight of 
his career, Terrain Vague (Wasteland) focused on a fictional gang of teenage miscreants who 
punctuated their boredom with a combination of petty theft and hooliganism. The film’s opening 
scene commenced in the somber corridors of a judicial court for minors. A reluctant judge, 
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seated before one repeat offender, sentenced the delinquent teen to time in a juvenile detention 
center, one final chance, the judge warned, before the youth reached adulthood. As the opening 
credits rolled across the screen, the viewer was met with atmospheric and eerie shots of vast 
housing complexes – huge, uniform rectangles outlined in the night sky, illuminated only by a 
random sprinkling of apartment lights. The scene lingered, showing the delinquent’s dejected 
mother ascending the countless flights of stairs, her steps echoing in the cavernous stairwell. The 
scene offered a not-so-subtle critique of the “modern” housing units – the sense of alienation and 
monotony they engendered – blotted across the French landscape in Paris and elsewhere.25 
The plot of Terrain Vague centered on the budding romantic relationship between Dan 
(short for Danièle), a boyish female leader of a local gang, and Lucky, a member of the group of 
young delinquents. Both fled the gang after its focus shifted from small-scale shoplifting to 
organized robbery. In the process, Lucky’s departure sabotaged the planned heist, thus drawing 
the gang’s ire and forcing the two into hiding in order to evade their former peers. In searching 
for the couple, the gang began to hassle one of the youngest gang members, Babar, who lived in 
the same HLM as Dan and thus represented the sole lifeline to finding the fleeing pair. Babar, 
who was ultimately an innocent and innocuous adolescent only searching for camaraderie, faced 
mounting harassment as the gang members became impatient in their search. As the film 
concluded, Babar, unable to handle the gang’s torment, committed suicide, complicating the 
young couple’s plans to escape and underscoring the gravity of the situation. Throughout the 
film, the delinquent teens found themselves confined to their isolated quarter on the margins of 
Paris, shown as a barren terrain devoid of landscaping. The composition of the gang was divided 
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between teens with true criminal aspirations and otherwise harmless youths who joined the gang 
in an effort to escape the monotony of their living situation. The social commentary was clear. 
Carné suggested that the circumstances created by the grands ensembles, a central tenet of 
France’s postwar modernization efforts, had a corrupting influence on French youth, inciting 
symptoms of juvenile delinquency.26 
The film underscored a popular perception about the links between juvenile delinquency 
and the grands ensembles. Alongside the critique of the HLM resided another narrative woven 
throughout Carné’s film. The petty thefts committed by the adolescent gang in Terrain Vague 
often amounted to little more than shoplifting of cheap goods, as the teens began to accumulate a 
collection of inexpensive consumer products. As Carné made clear, their thefts were not meant to 
supplement basic needs, but were instead exchanged for cash in a scheme to obtain spending 
money meant to abet their search for entertainment. The gang’s actions spoke to a more 
widespread societal concern – the question of teenage consumption in a newfound mass society.   
Mass Culture, Americanization, and the Question of Juvenile Delinquency 
 What especially troubled observers in the late 1950s was how some of the most apparent 
symptoms of juvenile delinquency seemed to be borne out of the emergent age of affluence 
reshaping France and other Western European countries. While the dilemma of juvenile 
delinquency was certainly not new, conventional wisdom had always linked it to the most 
marginalized segments of society. By contrast, in the early Fifth Republic instances of teenage 
crime were credited to all social classes amid a rising tide of juvenile delinquency, despite that 
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the standard of living and material prosperity were ostensibly higher than ever. This paradoxical 
phenomenon raised questions about the side effects of an emergent mass culture on 
impressionable youth precisely at a time when many debated the merits of France’s drift toward 
an American-style society of consumption. Questions of juvenile delinquency thus became 
deeply implicated in larger anxieties about a changing nation. For commentators, the blousons 
noirs became a cautionary tale about the dangers of adopting a lifestyle built on mass 
consumerism.   
The rise of mass consumer society was a key feature of what economist Jean Fourastié 
deemed the “Trente Glorieuses” (the “Thirty Glorious Years”), a period of unprecedented 
economic growth.27 Underway by the early 1950s and in full force by 1954, mass consumerism 
had a tremendous influence in shaping the composition of the everyday. It had ramifications 
across all aspects of French life, from business models and advertising strategies to grocery 
shopping and transportation. It altered perceptions of leisure and entertainment as well as work.28 
Mass consumerism shaped patterns of social organization and generally raised living standards 
across the French populace, while also serving to expose economic inequality and class-based 
divisions.29  
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 Despite a broad base of support for consumerist aspirations, there remained a societal 
ambivalence about the effect of American-style mass culture and mass consumption on 
“traditional” French culture.30 “Americanization,” offered a fluid term that cut across the 
political spectrum with which to lament the supposed impact of America, real or imagined, in all 
domains of French society. Whether discussing the expanded economic and political role of the 
United States in the postwar world order or simply making reference to “American” inventions 
like supermarkets or blue jeans, commentators applied the term with equal gusto. The concept 
galvanized many in France, from the left-leaning intellectual circles of Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Simone de Beauvoir to the shopkeeper populism of Pierre Poujade, and found articulation across 
a vast plane of cultural expression.31 Even as many embraced the promise and potential of 
technocratic modernization and mass consumption, the changes they imposed on the 
organization of everyday life appeared striking enough to prompt reflection, and occasionally 
strong criticism.   
  Using youth as its point of entry, a 1959 article in the weekly news magazine L’Express 
echoed larger social concerns about the coming of American-style mass consumer society in 
France. Glancing across the Atlantic, the magazine inspected consumption trends among 
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American teenagers. The United States, the article made clear, offered a glimpse into an 
uncertain future: “Those Americans have already put into practice what the French are only just 
beginning to have doubts about.”32 For L’Express, some of the habits proved dubious at best. It 
found that American teens regularly spent hours per week watching television or talking on the 
telephone, frequented cinemas, bought records and clothing, and worshipped rock and roll. This 
world of consumption was a testament, the article noted, to the growing economic clout of 
teenagers, an influence that spelled a slackening of parental authority. All of the developments 
covered had a particular resonance because they appeared to be a sign of things to come. “The 
readings of this survey are very instructive for us,” the article noted, because “what’s happening 
in the United States, in economic and commercial matters, only precedes what is going to pop up 
here soon.” Confirming the inevitability of these tendencies reaching France, in an unqualified 
but nevertheless potent statement, the article asserted that “specialists” considered French 
teenagers to be “the most Americanized in Europe.”33 
 But despite the concern revealed in L’Express, American mass culture and consumer 
products had already begun to infiltrate France in the preceding years. While cultural exports 
like Coca-Cola appeared intermittently in France as early as World War I, nothing in the postwar 
period symbolized the intrusion of American popular culture more than Hollywood film.34 To 
put the sheer magnitude in perspective, by the late 1950s there were roughly 500 American films 
released in Europe per year, compared to only about 450 films created by all of Europe 
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collectively. While the European masses generally appreciated American film, young people in 
particular found the style and imagery particular alluring.35 The 1953 film The Wild One, 
directed by László Benedek and starring Marlon Brando as the rebellious leader of an outlaw 
motorcycle gang, offered French teenagers a glimpse of American popular culture when it was 
released as L’Équipée sauvage in 1954. The 1955 film Rebel without a Cause swiftly followed 
The Wild One. Directed by Nicholas Ray and starring the charismatic James Dean, the film, 
released in France in 1956 as La Fureur de vivre, crafted a portrait of juvenile delinquency 
couched within suburban America. Attracting teens and worrying adults in equal measure, both 
films offered a romantic and stylish representation of youthful revolt draped in leather jackets, 
slick hair, and blue jeans.36  
 Though seductive to French teenagers, these films proved easy targets for French social 
commentators who viewed them as tasteless and subversive American cultural exports that 
contributed to (or even caused) juvenile delinquency. In particular, Marlon Brando and James 
Dean, both exuding a defiant cool eagerly emulated by teens in France and elsewhere, 
personified the invasive and suspect influence of postwar America. In his 1960 work Jeunesse en 
danger, Henri Joubrel, who was at the time a high-ranking figure in the French scouting 
movement, noted regrettably that “violence seems to be becoming the trend” among French 
teens.37 “These adolescents,” he found, “slumped against the walls like the cowboys in the 
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westerns” were capable of abrupt ferocity. He found that “an irresistible urge” brought teenage 
boys “to imitate Marlon Brando in The Wild One or James Dean from Rebel without a Cause.”38 
Similarly, the educator and writer Antonin Bondat, in his 1962 work Jeunesse et famille à 
l’heure de l’atome, feared that American idols, emblematic of mass culture, encouraged an 
atmosphere of conformity. Just as a million young girls blindly copied the ever-changing 
hairstyles of Brigitte Bardot, he wrote, “the jacket of James Dean” is passed onto future 
generations in “the aisles of the cinema,” becoming “the harness of a disoriented youth.”39 Other 
commentators, pointing to James Dean and others with regularity, drew equally hyperbolic 
conclusions about the dangers of an emergent system built around consumerism and mass 
culture.40     
Even the expert class had reservations about the influence of what Bondat called the 
“imbecilic cult of the idol.”41 In 1959, Philippe Parrot and Monique Gueneau, a pair of 
collaborating social scientists working under the leadership of Georges Hahn, a respected and 
well-published psychologist, assessed the influence of idols of teen cinema. In their work Les 
Gangs d’adolescents, the duo declared:  
We have signaled that the delinquents find the source for their criminal 
techniques in comics and films. The press and the cinema supply nothing 
except recipes: they act in a very psychological way in giving to the young 
people the possibilities of identification that the young cannot find in the 
family: their heroes are going to be Eddie Constantine, James Dean, Marlon 
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Brando, and Brigitte Bardot. The manner of dressing and the haircuts copy 
these stars.42 
As these critiques attest, the influence of American popular culture, personified by Marlon 
Brando and James Dean, was one debated by commentators of many stripes. All were convinced 
that, on some level, American popular culture and the mass consumerism it celebrated had a 
suspect influence on impressionable French youth.   
 What appeared especially startling was how instances of juvenile delinquency, instigated 
by popular culture and crass habits of consumerism imported from the United States, readily 
permeated class boundaries and social groups. This phenomenon, it seemed to many, was a new 
and unprecedented facet, one that defied a conventional wisdom that linked juvenile delinquency 
to “asocial” degenerates otherwise segregated from the larger social body. Parrot and Geuneau, 
in their 1959 study of teenage gangs, pointed to the US, where “juvenile delinquency has taken 
the most spectacular importance,” to demonstrate the new contours of the problem. Examples of 
juvenile, inner-city crime in New York City and elsewhere offered vivid examples to underscore 
their point. Anticipating the class and race-based assumptions of their audience, however, the 
researchers insisted that readers should not assume that the criminal offenses emanated from 
actors of “proletarian and sub-proletarian milieus,” adding that they found an ever-increasing 
number of “bourgeois youth gangs.” “The gang phenomenon has thus become a general 
phenomenon that affects all social strata,” they concluded.43 Emile Copfermann drew similar 
conclusions in his 1962 reflection on the blousons noirs. He averred that if prior World War II, 
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juvenile delinquency had primarily affected “working-class milieus,” it had “gravely extended” 
in the postwar period to include “bourgeois families” as well.44 With delinquency and 
hooliganism extending to middle-class teenagers, attention turned to the youth-oriented mass 
culture, availed by rising prosperity, and its influence in shaping the blousons noirs.  
French Rock and Roll and the Legacy of the Blousons Noirs  
The rise of rock and roll reinforced the association between teenage consumption and 
delinquency. It encouraged many of the same debates about the influence of mass culture that 
films like Rebel without a Cause provoked several years prior. The images of teenage 
consumption, crafted in the media, were inextricably linked to the supposed savagery of the 
musical genre. It played into the same fears about Americanization, as well as a general anxiety 
about the consequences of a culture built on mass consumerism, only here the danger spoke 
French. The growth of indigenous rock and roll represented a new threat from within and served 
as an apparent measure of France’s Americanization.    
Rock and roll’s ascent was slower and later in France than in most other Western 
European countries. There had been rumblings during the 1950s. In 1956, for instance, Bill 
Haley and the Comets’ “Rock around the Clock” became a bestseller and the Frenchman Henri 
Salvador, performing under the alias Henry Cording, released four satirical, but nevertheless 
successful, rock and roll songs.45 Others, like Gilbert Bécaud, whose energetic live performances 
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earned him the name “Monsieur 100,000 volts,” attained success in this early period of French 
rock and roll.46 Building on this modest foundation, by the early 1960s France had produced a 
steady ensemble of rock and roll stars. The first to achieve success was Richard Anthony, who 
began releasing singles from late-1958 onward. The Egyptian-born singer who nevertheless 
performed in French scored his biggest hits adapting popular American songs by artists like 
Bobby Darin, the Everly Brothers, and the Coasters.47 Soon came musical acts with vaguely 
ominous-sounding names like the Chaussettes Noires (the Black Socks) and the Chats Sauvages 
(the Wild Cats). Undoubtedly, the most popular of all though was a young artist performing 
under the stage name Johnny Hallyday. With boyish good looks, a distinct if unexceptional vocal 
ability, and a physical presence derivative of Elvis Presley, the young performer quickly became 
the face of French rock and roll. He released his first disc in March of 1960 with the record label 
Vogue.48 Within a year he was performing to sellout crowds in some of France’s most 
prestigious performing halls, including the Olympia in Paris.  
The rise of rock and roll in France was inseparable from the simultaneous appearance of 
a mass consumer society. The raucous sounds of electric guitars emanating from jukeboxes, 
record players, and transistor radios became a potent symbol of an emergent mass culture in 
France. It signaled the arrival of the teenage consumer, as adolescents readily forfeited their 
newly acquired spending money in exchange for records, clothing, radios, and cinema tickets.49 
The consumer revolution was swift, availing the dissemination of rock and roll. In 1958, for 
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instance, there were only 260,000 transistor radios in the Hexagon. Within three short years, that 
number had grown eight-fold to over 2.2 million.50 Studies from the period found that a growing 
number of teenagers owned an assortment of consumer products, including record players and 
musical instruments. A lucky few even owned their own automobiles. Meanwhile, some of the 
leading teenage musical performers sold records by the millions. For those adolescents unable to 
buy their own records, some 20,000 jukeboxes were scattered throughout France availing teens 
of the latest hits songs.51 These symbols, and the ubiquitous sounds and sights they provided, 
announced the flourishing of a society of consumption. 
However, the arrival of a truly mass culture, built on consumer capitalism, was not 
without its critics. Vocal commentators decried its banal nature, standardizing tendencies, and 
propensity to fetishize particular idols and celebrities. The very same qualities that offered a 
class-crossing democratization of culture also represented an attack on traditional notions of high 
culture and taste. Rock and roll, with its supposedly unintelligent lyrics and simplistic musical 
arrangements, became a soft target for commentators decrying the effects of the mass production 
of culture.  
The links between French rock and roll and the larger issue of Americanization were 
accentuated by some of most visible rock stars from the era. It was customary, for instance, for 
early performers to adopt American-sounding names. Claude Moine, the lead singer of the 
Chaussettes Noires, performed under the name Eddy Mitchell. The Chats Sauvages front man, 
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Hervé Forneri, operated as Dick Rivers. Most famously, the young Frenchman Jean-Philippe 
Smet went on to become the famed Johnny Hallyday. In fact, Hallyday, perhaps more than any 
other performer, cultivated ties to America; in the early period of his career, his record company 
marketed him as being born in America and being bilingual in both English and French (neither 
of which was true).52 The tactic may have helped authenticate Hallyday to a generation of French 
teenagers infatuated with American popular culture. For older generations, however, 
Americanized performers like Hallyday and his peers lent credence to the notion that France was 
being recast as a modernized society of mass culture akin to the United States.          
Commentators feared that mass culture, of which rock and roll was emblematic, created 
an atmosphere of conformity, one that discouraged independent thinking and individuality. For 
Roger Holeindre, a far-right political activist and Algerian War veteran, the coming of rock and 
roll reflected a larger struggle whereby a weakened France, shorn of its empire, succumbed to 
the temptations of American-style mass consumerism. Holeindre understood why rock and roll 
and the Twist resonated with young people, but he feared that it was symptomatic of a generation 
of youths rendered uninspired and unproductive by a vapid popular culture. While it is normal 
for young people to sing and dance, he wrote, “it is nevertheless abnormal that their horizon 
stops there” and while Johnny Hallyday might be the “idol” of French youth, “it is unthinkable 
that beyond this young singer, there is nothing else.”53 He questioned the wild haircuts, the 
hardened visages, and the shouting. Above all, he wondered, “why these American names?” 
Emile Copfermann, meanwhile, pondered the multiple ways that the “amusement industry” 
                                                 
52 Chris Tinker, “Rock and Roll Stardom: Johnny Hallyday,” in Stardom in Postwar France, ed. John 
Gaffney and Diana Holmes (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 71-72.  
53 Roger Holeindre, Honneur ou Décadence (Paris: Fuseau, 1965), 184.  
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shaped an image of youth and encouraged the masses to follow. He found that the tenets of mass 
culture promoted instant gratification and a lack of intellectual engagement. Pointing to rock and 
roll as an example, he believed that young people embraced it because it could be consumed and 
enjoyed immediately and without thought.54 Similarly, Henri Joubrel observed a growing 
tendency for young people, content to do nothing productive with their free time, to loiter in the 
streets like “sheep huddled together before the storm” listening to their “narcotic,” rock and 
roll.55 For these various critics, rock and roll embodied a mediocrity bestowed by American-style 
mass culture that sapped the individualism of an entire generation. 
Rock and roll also exacerbated existing fears about juvenile delinquency. The 
controversy linked to the nascent musical genre quickly became woven into the existing 
discourse on the blousons noirs. From its inception, rock and roll conjured images of teenage 
hooliganism. Over a span of two years, observers had linked the musical style to teen-related 
disturbances in over five hundred cities across three continents.56 In France, 1961 marked the 
emergence of rock and roll festivals. The Palais des Sports in Paris provided the setting for these 
spectacles. Like the festival held in February of 1961, the concerts often featured any 
combination of scandals. Some teenage attendees brawled in the crowd. Others destroyed and 
dismantled stadium seating. On occasion, police needed to intervene to bolster security. In some 
instances, concertgoers even hurled objects at the musical performers.57 These antics, covered in 
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the press, harkened the same type of delinquent acts ascribed earlier to the blousons noirs and 
lent the impression that rock and roll attracted, even incited, violent behavior.  
The image procured by early French rock and roll stars only enhanced this perception. 
Some of the most recognizable figures of French rock donned the familiar leather, blue jeans, 
and greased hairdos in an effort to seize some of the same cool defiance exuded by American 
idols like James Dean and Elvis Presley. Vince Taylor, more than any other singer, typified this 
trend. For many, Taylor embodied the most ominous aspects of rock and roll. He wore black 
leather from head to toe, the solid dark mass interrupted only by an ostentatious chain draped 
over his unbuttoned shirt; his hair, as dark as the leather he wore, greased into an elaborate 
coiffeur. Taylor, a British-born rocker who sang in English, earned a reputation for his frenetic 
live performances filled with provocative twists and gyrations.58 Outfitted in garb strikingly 
similar to those of the blousons noirs while serving frenzied and riotous live performances, stars 
like Taylor helped cement the links between rock and roll and teenage delinquency. 
This conflation of rock and roll with the ominous imagery of the blousons noirs was 
mocked in a 1960 song by Gilbert Bécaud, a performer who only several years prior had 
captured the attention of French teenagers before being displaced by the meteoric rise of singers 
like Hallyday. His song “Age Tendre et Tête de Bois” (“Tender-aged and Stubborn”) aimed to 
mock the apparent changes to youth-oriented music in France.59 Sung in a sardonic tone, the 
lyrics described a sordid relationship between two delinquent teens who spent their time together 
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in the streets at night. Bécaud joked in the lyric that, with the girl wearing pants and a jacket, 
onlookers would think they saw two males together. The second verse made clear that these 
delinquents represented prime examples of Americanized French youth. The two characters 
described in the song spent all of their days going to the cinema, drinking Coca-Cola, and lurking 
around jukeboxes. In an effectively sarcastic way, Bécaud managed to craft the image of two 
delinquent teens seduced by the allure of leisure and consumption.60 They were caricatures of 
Americanized “others,” an image that, however exaggerated, reflected popular perceptions about 
young rock and roll fans.      
The half-joking barbs levied in song lyrics were hardly a stretch though. Serious studies 
from the era corroborated what Bécaud and others only assumed. The Centre de Formation et de 
Recherche de l’Education Surveillée observed that recreational sites, including cinemas, cafés, 
and arcades, often served to foster and incubate the formation of juvenile gangs. One Paris police 
captain found that the cafés and bars featuring jukeboxes attracted, above all else, adolescents 
who enjoy the “thundering atmosphere of modern music,” a setting that facilitated the creation of 
youth gangs and served to “foment asocial acts.”61 The concern over teenagers congregating in 
cafés and elsewhere was part of a larger interest in understanding the growth of adolescent 
leisure as an integral part of the emergent age of affluence and its accompanying society of 
consumption. During the late 1950s, the economic affluence and prosperity trickled down to 
many teenagers in the form of disposable income. The period also witnessed a sweeping 
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expansion of secondary and university education. As a result, adolescents remained students 
longer and, though they possessed some money of their own, were freed of much of the 
responsibilities to work and contribute to the family income, resulting in a growth of leisure as a 
significant part of teenage life. While the French state actively promoted sporting activities and 
youth cultural centers to occupy and educate young people, the growth of idle leisure seemed a 
likely cause for gang formation and delinquent behavior. Indeed, in direct contrast to youth 
idealized by the French state, the imagery of delinquent teenagers loitering in cinemas and cafés 
offered evidence to the supposed dangers of leisure time spent consuming mass culture.62 
It was, to observers at least, a new and unprecedented trend spreading across France. Not 
limited to the working-class quarters of large cities, the mass culture-fueled juvenile delinquency 
threatened to reach even the quietest of villages. Jean Cau, an award-winning journalist for the 
weekly news magazine L’Express wrote a 1961 article titled “Return to My Village.” In the 
piece, the author recounted a recent return to his natal village, a sleepy commune situated to the 
north of Paris, and his surprise upon witnessing a number of palpable changes. The village, he 
wrote, was filled with ominous teens who lined the main thoroughfares in foreboding hordes. 
Inquiring to his nephew about the recent phenomenon, the adolescent informed him that the 
idyllic commune was now “full of blousons noirs.”63 Who were these young troublemakers? 
When asking his nephew about the teenagers in question, Cau was shocked to learn their origins. 
One was the son of a butcher, the others were the offspring of low-level bureaucrats. They were 
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from respectable families, he discovered, remarking that there was “not a single assassin among 
the fathers of these young terrors.”64   
They defied the working-class, urban stereotype that had previously been affixed to the 
image of juvenile delinquency. Yet there they stood, lined along the streets with dyed and slicked 
hair, blue jeans, and opened shirts. Later in the article, Cau pointed to an upcoming Johnny 
Hallyday concert, an obvious culprit for the manifestation of blousons noirs in his petite 
childhood commune. “This national calamity named Johnny Hallyday,” the author wrote, had 
disembarked in the village, Persan, as part of his 1961 tour. Cau recounted Hallyday’s search for 
the director of the municipal theater. Hallyday, he wrote, asked how many police would be 
available for the upcoming concert, warning that young people had destroyed venues on each 
stop of his tour. According to Cau, the theater director replied, “Ho, ho! Here isn’t everywhere. 
It’s calm here; the young people are calm; nothing happens here.” Sure enough, when Cau asked 
about the concert, his nephew confirmed that, true to Hallyday’s warning, the young people had 
proceeded to cause an uproarious commotion.65   
The veracity of Cau’s account cannot be verified. Even if he took journalistic liberties, 
though, the point remains the same. Cau spoke for many in his consternation towards the 
youthful trends built on a foundation of mass culture and consumption. A thought near the end of 
his piece was telling. “Today, young people neither whistle nor sing. They shout,” he wrote. “At 
what? At the death of all the gods (father, France, family, church, etc.)” in front of the idols who 
have captured France’s adolescence.66 For Cau, like many others, the blousons noirs represented 
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an unseemly harbinger of a changing France. During the period, from roughly 1958 to 1962, the 
image of teenage consumption and mass culture became synonymous with the blousons noirs, as 
influential voices speculated about the role of film and music in instigating adolescent 
hooliganism. Even as other aspects of mass consumer society had already woven their way into 
the fabric of French society, the areas that related to teenagers, such as rock and roll, remained 
objects of controversy. The blousons noirs, imagined as Americanized, working-class “others,” 
became a not-so-subtle way to question tangible aspects of France’s modernizing process. The 
blousons noirs became enmeshed in debates about everything from HLM apartment complexes 
to American popular culture. It was not until 1962 that the image of teenage consumerism began 
to be divorced from the blousons noirs and juvenile delinquency. Only once an assortment of 
commercial forces built an image of youth in contrast to the blousons noirs did youth-oriented 
mass culture gain widespread acceptance. It was through this process that youth consumerism 
became a rationalized and sanitized part of modern France.  
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CHAPTER 2: ENVISIONING MODERN FRANCE IN THE TEMPS DES 
COPAINS, 1962-1966 
In late 1962, a new song, titled “Le Temps de l’Amour” (“The Age of Love”) could be 
heard emanating from transistor radios and jukeboxes all over France. As a reverb-laden guitar 
echoed over a dancing bass line and a driving drum beat, breathy, atmospheric vocals launched 
into the song’s first verse: “It’s the age of love, the age of copains and adventure.”1 The singer 
was Françoise Hardy, a soft-spoken eighteen year old from Paris’ Ninth Arrondissement. The 
song, which sang about the pleasures and pains of teenage romance, typified a new style of 
popular music, one that bore a resemblance to rock and roll but which notably lacked the music’s 
edge and controversy. Hardy likewise represented a stark departure from earlier rock and roll 
performers. The genre of which Hardy was a part, eventually termed yé-yé, gained widespread 
popularity, providing for a fleeting moment the vibrant sights and sounds of an era. It announced 
the arrival of teenage consumption on a grand scale and projected the image of a confident and 
forward-looking France buoyed by its youthful exuberance. 
Coming immediately on the heels of France’s bloody flight from empire, the “time of 
copains” signaled a reorientation of “modern” France. During its relatively short lifespan, yé-yé 
offered the dominant discursive image of youth during the era, the copain. By virtue of its sheer 
ubiquity, the copain helped shape normative values of the ideal French teenager and, by 
extension, modern France. This idealized portrait of adolescence upheld the image of the white, 
bourgeois student as the universal teen experience. At the same time, the mass media, which 
ultimately constructed the idealized copains, demonstrated an embrace of France’s increasingly 
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technocratic society of mass consumerism and technological progress, all while straddling an 
apolitical stance well-suited to the social and political tone set by Charles de Gaulle and his 
fellow Gaullists in the early Fifth Republic. Altogether, the discursive image of the copain, so 
prominent in the popular culture of yé-yé, offered a vision for French youth that was forward-
looking and worry-free. This particular construct, as the chapter suggests, proved well-timed to 
its unique historical context and ultimately helped articulate a vision of modern France removed 
from its colonial past.     
The Rise of Yé-Yé  
Les années yé-yé lasted for the better part of the 1960s. The core elements were in place 
by 1961, and the phenomenon’s height was in the years 1963-1964 before the arrival of 
competing British music and other French genres diminished its popularity.2 The rise of yé-yé 
was made possible by the expansion of the mass media in the period following the Second World 
War, by the rise of a system of mass consumer capitalism, and the emergence of a vast market of 
commodities created specifically for teenagers. The importance of this context cannot be 
overstated. These components allowed for the carving out of a unique space for teenagers and, 
with it, the construction of an identifiable image of yé-yé youth. Popular music formed the basis 
for this expansion and provided the means to organize a sizeable portion France’s youth into a 
distinct category. In particular, the personal transistor radio and, to a lesser extent, the record 
player provided the requisite means to forge an outlet for teens based on popular music made 
specifically for them. These two products symbolized the teenage consumer revolution. As 
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Anne-Marie Sohn writes, the portable transistor radio became the signifier of youthful 
independence. By the mid-1960s the price had lowered to the point that they were affordable 
objects to all social classes. In 1961 some 40% of young people already owned one, a number 
that rose to 46% by 1966. With similar popularity, 42% of adolescents between 15-20 years old 
owned their own turntable by 1966.3  
It is therefore unsurprising that the first signal of a vibrant, music-oriented popular 
culture for teenagers came in the autumn of 1959 with the launch of the radio program Salut les 
copains on the commercial station Europe 1.4 The idea for the program came from Daniel 
Filipacchi and Frank Ténot, two radio hosts with backgrounds in jazz who recognized an 
opportunity to create a product for the growing population of French teenagers.5 Their program 
offered the latest in American and eventually British and French popular music. Initially 
broadcast only once per week, the success of the program quickly made Salut les copains a daily 
fixture, airing at five o’clock in the afternoon just in time to catch teenagers returning home from 
school. This brainchild of Filipacchi and Ténot was responsible, perhaps more than any other 
source, for creating the momentum for yé-yé by directing young people en masse toward the 
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popular music genre. Its influence was immense, largely because of the central role of the radio 
in the lives of teenagers. An Institut Français d’Opinion Publique (IFOP) study in 1966 found 
that 62% of adolescents between 15 and 20 years old listened to the radio daily; 81% listened at 
least several times per week. When asked about their favorite programs, of which many were 
listed, one in three chose Salut les copains.6 Within a few short years, numerous emulators had 
programs on competing stations.   
The overwhelming success of the radio program Salut les copains prompted its creators 
to venture into print media. The two had already tried their hand at a monthly jazz magazine and 
recognized a similar opportunity to launch a publication for France’s growing youth. The 
eponymously-titled magazine hit newsstands in July 1962, with an initial print run of 50,000 
copies selling out almost immediately. By December of that year, the magazine was already 
selling some 600,000 copies per month; at the one year mark the number had surpassed a 
million.7 But the numbers alone do not adequately reflect the sheer magnitude of Salut les 
copains. An IFOP poll from September 1963 found that one out of every two young people 
between the ages of 15 and 20 read the magazine.8 “Who hasn’t seen school children, heading to 
class, ostentatiously brandishing an issue of SLC,” remarked one observer in 1965. Confirming 
its ubiquity, he affirmed that “no city … [or] social class has escaped it.”9 
The popularity of Salut les copains opened the floodgates and set the standard formula 
for the genre: a healthy mixture of editorials, breezy quizzes and advice columns, token 
                                                 
6 Christian Delporte, “Au miroir des medias,” in Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli, eds., La 
culture de masse en France: De la Belle Epoque à aujourd’hui (Paris: Fayard, 2002), 335.  
7 Michel Winock, Chronique des années soixante (Paris: Seuil, 1987), 99.   
8 Jean-François Sirinelli, Les baby-boomers: Une génération 1945-1969 (Paris: Fayard, 2003), 158.    
9 Jacques Marny, Les adolescents d’aujourd’hui (Paris: Centurion, 1965), 115. 
50 
 
reportage of new music, and tantalizing coverage of the celebrity teen idols. In its wake came 
countless imitators: Bonjour les amis in late 1962, Age tendre et tête de bois in early 1963, 
Twenty in spring 1964, and Formidable in spring 1965, to name a few.10 In late 1964, Filipacchi 
and his media group bought the rival Age tendre et tête de bois, converting it into a magazine 
meant for teenage girls. Titled Mademoiselle âge tendre, the publication expressed more interest 
in the fashions, romances, and hairstyles of the teen idols than their music. The success of yé-yé 
even prompted unlikely organizations like the French Communist Party to venture into popular 
music-oriented magazines.11  
 The rise of yé-yé also announced a shift in popular music, one that consciously sought to 
strip rock and roll of its controversy and instead replace it with a musical form that appeared safe 
for youth consumption. Yé-yé aimed to retain the energy and youthful exuberance that made rock 
and roll popular while providing a sanitized alternative. This transformation came in part from an 
evolution in the music industry. Recognizing the potential for profit in the teenage market, from 
1961 onward major record companies began to send out talent scouts in search of young 
performers who could be transformed into the next chart-topper. These company talent agents, 
wielding tremendous influence, often selected stage names, assembled groups, and managed the 
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contracts of their young clients, all in the name of maximizing commercial profits.12 Alongside 
the music industry, the youth-oriented mass media also played a central role in taming rock and 
roll. With the radio program Salut les copains for instance, Michel Brillié, one of the program’s 
on-air hosts during period, recollected that “there was nothing provocative” about the program, 
adding that “parents liked it” because “it was not dangerous” for their children.13 This perception 
was likewise confirmed at the time by Filipacchi who maintained that “the important thing 
[about the radio program] has been to demonstrate, to those who seemed to ignore it, that youth 
isn’t a weakness and that teenagers are not necessarily simpletons or hysterics.”14 These efforts 
to tame rock and roll was accompanied by changing consumer tastes. By 1961 rock and roll had 
been mostly eclipsed by the international dance craze the Twist followed by the rise of a more 
generalized and commercially-based pop music featuring upbeat instrumentation coupled with 
lyrics about teenage romances and other similarly banal topics.15  
 At the same time, the new pop stars that rose to stardom during yé-yé had a distinctly 
tamer, more respectable appearance than their earlier rock and roll counterparts.16 The arrival of 
female singers, something that was conspicuously absent in the early years of rock and roll, 
signified this shift. The first was Sylvie Vartan, a coquettish blond whose career launched with a 
1961 duet with the already-established Frankie Jordan. By 1962 she was a household name, 
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setting trends in both clothing and hairstyle. Both Françoise Hardy and Sheila followed. Hardy, 
who became a star following the success of her 1962 single “Tous Les Garçons Et Les Filles” 
(“All the Boys and Girls”), cultivated a persona that was both cerebral and demure. Sheila, born 
Anny Chancel, by contrast possessed a girl-next door wholesome appeal aided by songs like “La 
Première Surprise Partie” (“The First Surprise Party”). Debuting in late 1962, she attained 
stardom by the following year. A number of new male pop stars gained fame too. There was 
Claude François, whose 1962 song “Belles! Belles! Belles!” made him an immediate star, 
followed by other similarly innocuous acts like Frank Alamo.17 The more established stars like 
Johnny Hallyday likewise altered their appearance to reflect a more suitable image.18   
 When yé-yé was at its peak, these young idols briefly displaced the more respected stars 
of la chanson française like Georges Brassens and Jacques Brel as the most popular acts in 
France.19 A poll from September 1963 listed Johnny Hallyday as France’s most popular male 
singer, tied with the crooner Charles Aznavour and only slightly ahead of Claude François. With 
regard to female singers, Sheila, Françoise Hardy, and Sylvie Vartan were named the top three 
performers in France respectively, far surpassing older acts like Edith Piaf and Juliette Gréco.20 
But these pop stars were not simply celebrities. Instead, they were teen “idols,” a category 
wholly separate from the more traditional markers of stardom, one that suggested a level of 
familiarity and intimacy normally absent from the celebrity-fan relationship. What the term 
indicated was that the popular singers were generally not much older than their fans with whom 
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they supposedly shared the same interests, tastes, and experiences. This was evidenced in the 
way that fans and the mass media alike referred to these idols by their first name, creating the 
appearance that yé-yé represented a genuine community. “The yé-yé idol is no longer some 
faraway divinity,” wrote Jacques Marny in 1965, but rather “more like the big brother or big 
sister who has succeeded.”21 The supposed intimacy between audiences and singers was 
perpetuated in the mass media as magazines and television programs offered unceasing 
snapshots into the personal lives of the idols. Though undoubtedly mediated to preserve the 
sanitized image of the teen idols, the mass media provided detailed accounts of their vacations, 
romantic relationships, consumer preferences, and interests.22 And though their every move was 
intimately followed and dissected by the media, these idols never wore the celebrity label. 
Instead, they were treated as typical teenagers with familiar, relatable backgrounds.   
 The rise of yé-yé as a popular culture brought with it the image of the copain. The term 
“copain” is perhaps best translated in English as either “buddy” or “pal,” a decidedly less formal 
counterpart to the word “ami,” or “friend.” It became an expression, used ad nauseam, to refer to 
the participants of yé-yé, both the musical performers as well as their fans. Used casually 
between teenagers, the word simultaneously found its way into a bevy of commercial products, 
from song lyrics and album titles to magazines and advertisements.23 Marketers needed only to 
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use the word “copain” to announce the youthful appeal of their product.24 Its usage became so 
widespread that, as one commentator noted, a person could not listen to the radio or open a 
newspaper without “hearing talk about ‘copains’ or ‘yé-yé.’” The word was thus “no longer a 
term of camaraderie used between boys” but instead had “fully become a category of young 
people.”25 At the same time, the discursive image of the copain became a paragon of adolescent 
bourgeois normativity, providing the dominant media representation of French teenagers in the 
early-to-mid 1960s. As portrayed, the copains were carefree teenagers who found pleasure 
through innocuous leisure and consumption. They were also the model middle-class students 
whose apolitical stance and forward-looking disposition made them well-suited to the national 
imperatives of modernization.     
 The legitimization of the copain came in part from its clear contrast to the earlier 
blousons noirs, as observers readily affirmed the wholesome characteristics of yé-yé youth. “The 
first thing that astonishes, it is their politeness” wrote Michel Cournot for L’Express following an 
April 1963 concert at the Olympia in Paris.26 Describing a crowded concert hall of some two 
thousand teenagers waiting for the show to begin, he witnessed no unrest amongst the attendees, 
only teens sitting patiently “speaking in hushed voices with their sister[s], their friend[s], their 
classmates.”27 A January 1963 article in the weekly entertainment magazine Télé 7 jours 
confirmed the same: “Except for the hairstyle … the teenagers have nothing in common with the 
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blousons noirs.” Unlike the blousons noirs, “their worldview isn’t hopeless” and “their 
appearance is well-groomed.” Additionally, the article noted, the copains were thoughtful 
contributors to society. “The teenagers don’t drink alcohol. The majority work. Some of them 
still go to school. Others already have a career.”28 The tone and perception of journalists had 
changed markedly from only a few years prior.  
 In the pages of the presse des jeunes (youth press), commentators likewise came to the 
defense of the copains, contrasting for their readership (who would have been almost exclusively 
teenagers) the wholesome yé-yé with their earlier counterparts, the blousons noirs.29 In the first 
issue of Age tendre et tête de bois, for instance, the editor Jean-Patrick Maury introduced his 
magazine in an opening editorial that delineated a space for the new youth of yé-yé. Seeking to 
adopt some of the edgy language of earlier rock and roll, he affirmed to his readership that “it is 
our lust for life that protects us from being bourgeois.” “But,” he added, “our parents don’t 
worry, [because] we hate the blousons noirs, the broken chairs, and the shouting.”30 Adding this 
caveat, the editor was no doubt mindful of the need to assuage apprehensive parents while 
reminding readers that yé-yé was not analogous with earlier rock and roll trends. Instead, as the 
passage illustrates, it co-opted the notion of youthful exuberance while stripping it of all 
potential controversy. By 1966, any lingering comparisons to the blousons noirs were simply 
dismissed as inconsequential. André Arnaud, in his regular Salut les copains column “Copains 
flashes,” acknowledged that if the blousons noirs had caused dread among sociologists and 
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moralists in the previous decade, “today these famous blousons noirs are married, have children, 
[and] earn a living.”31   
 Not only was yé-yé stripped of the suspect elements of the blousons noirs and rock and 
roll, it also managed to shed the blatant accusations of Americanization that had plagued the 
earlier instances of teenage popular culture in France. Despite the fact that the music of yé-yé 
was still largely derivative of American musical genres (indeed, many of the best-selling hits 
were adaptations of American songs), the phenomenon proved able to add enough Gallic flair to 
make it seem appropriately “French.” This perception was evidenced in a publication from 1966: 
The expression “yé-yé” cannot be applied to anybody except the “French 
idols” and to the French “copains.” There is, in effect, no relationship 
between the traits of a French “idol,” like Johnny Hallyday … and that of a 
foreign “idol,” like John Lennon (the Beatle-writer) … There is no 
relationship … between the petite-bourgeois spirit of Claude François’ songs 
… and the slightly special spirit (long live drugs, long live sex) of the songs 
of the Rolling Stones … The yé-yé are French and proud of being so.32      
At the same time, whereas earlier stars, including Johnny Hallyday, Dick Rivers, and Eddy 
Mitchell, adopted American sounding stage names – some even going so far as to invent 
backstories linking them to America – by 1962 many of the new musicals acts affirmed their 
French credentials. Suddenly, the likes of Françoise Hardy, Claude François, Michèle Torr, and 
France Gall added an unmistakably French identity to the musical genre, even if some new stars, 
like Sheila and Frank Alamo, continued to employ vaguely American sounding names. At least 
one reader writing to Salut les copains was pleased about this development. Thinking of Claude 
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François, Marie-Claire Monjeau wrote that “finally, a French singer … whose first move hasn’t 
been to Americanize his name!”33  
Inclusion and Exclusion in a Modernized France 
The sheer popularity of yé-yé allowed the image of the copain to become a visible 
signifier of French adolescence in the mid-1960s. Though there were teenagers who fit the 
description, the copain (and copine) was primarily a discursive construct, willed into existence 
through an unending assortment of carefully-crafted magazine articles, advertisements, television 
programs, and other visual representations. It was an ideal, constantly being created and 
recreated in media discourse. The copain was “universalist” in its conception and aspiration, 
meaning that it aimed to represent and reflect the category of youth, not any one particular social 
strata. Despite these ambitions, “youth,” as defined in the yé-yé media, became the privileged 
position of France’s white, urban, and increasingly technocratic middle class. It described 
adolescence in terms that bode well for the modernizing aspirations of the Gaullist state and for a 
French nation in search of a new national identity. Its forward-looking optimism contributed to 
and reflected the larger societal desire to forget France’s colonial past. In the process, it masked 
ongoing social disparities and tensions that few were willing to address.  
Since the end of World War II, the language of “modernization” had given many in 
France – technocrats, politicians, businessmen, consumers, and artists – common purpose, 
providing a means to articulate a desire for deliberate change, for newness. With fresh memories 
of the defeat in 1940 and the subsequent occupation-collaboration, the institutions and policies of 
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the interwar years irrevocably discredited, the concept appealed to a large portion of the 
population who believed that France needed to be remade and transformed.34 With the advent of 
the Fifth Republic in 1958, the goal of modernization took on new imperatives. For the new 
president Charles de Gaulle, it became a means to restore French grandeur and to announce the 
return of France’s international influence and prestige, particularly with the fate of empire 
uncertain. De Gaulle’s preoccupation with France’s economic, industrial, and social 
modernization was made clear in a speech given on June 14, 1960. Eloquent and impassioned, 
the speech explained the need to “transform our old France into a new country” by making it 
“marry its century” [épouser son temps]. With the rise of decolonization, change had become the 
country’s “great national ambition.” The choice was clear: ascend to the “rank of a great 
industrial state” or “resign ourselves to decline.”35 
A cornerstone of France’s modernization efforts, and the one that most directly involved 
teenagers, was the expansion and reconstitution of education. As a key to the country’s 
transformation, de Gaulle cited the need to improve national education to a level that 
“corresponds to modern times.”36 Education, and the creation of an educated workforce capable 
of managing a modernized economy, therefore became a central focus of state efforts in the early 
Fifth Republic. Education’s portion of the state budget doubled between 1956 and 1965. 
Additionally, the government enacted a number of reforms. In 1959, the school-leaving age was 
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raised from age 14 to 16.37 The following year, the Ministry of Education merged technical 
training, previously its own segregated division, into the general framework of secondary and 
higher education.38 At the same time, the student population ballooned. In a 1964 speech, de 
Gaulle’s Prime Minister Georges Pompidou touted the growth of France’s student population: 
from 5 million students in 1939 to almost 9 million in 1964, from 440,000 (1939) to 1.8 million 
(1964) in secondary education, and from 70,000 students (1939) to 510,000 (1964) receiving 
technical education.39    
The expansion of education, and the corresponding prolonging of adolescence, had a 
palpable effect on the perception of youth. As Jean-François Sirinelli argues, the education 
system underwent more change over a ten year span between the 1950s and 1960s than it had in 
the preceding half-century.40 As a result, school, not work, became the primary focal point of 
modern adolescence. Yé-yé reflected this new student ideal. Claudine Coppin, for instance, found 
fleeting success with a 1963 single called “Le Twist du Bac” (“The Baccalauréat Twist”).41  
Sheila’s first single, titled “L’Ecole est Finie” (“School Has Finished”), recounted the 
burgeoning love of two teenagers – one seventeen, the other eighteen – who had completed their 
schooling.42 In interviews and in media representations, the teen idols of yé-yé frequently 
referenced their school experiences. The most obvious was Sylvie Vartan who, early in her 
career, became known as the “schoolgirl of rock” [the “collégienne du rock”]. In 1962, the 
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television show L’Avenir est à vous, depicting the seventeen-year-old singer in a scholastic 
setting, interviewed Vartan’s teachers and fellow students who deemed her at once both a 
“studious student” and a “modern girl.”43        
For all the optimism though, aspiration often outpaced results for much of the 1960s. The 
existing education system, despite its egalitarian aims, had long served to harden class divisions 
in French society. Starting with the creation of universal primary education following passage of 
the Ferry Laws in 1881, public education aimed to democratize opportunity for all French youth 
through a system of compulsory, secular schooling. In reality though, the education system often 
served to perpetuate the existing class structure in French society. Since the nineteenth century, 
secondary education (lycée) provided the demarcation line between the bourgeoisie and the 
lower classes (the peasantry and the working class). Generally speaking, working-class youths, 
needing to enter the workforce, tended to leave school at an earlier age, while their middle-class 
peers, with an eye towards the prestigious baccalauréat and eventual university admission, 
continued to pursue education.44 Studies from the early Fifth Republic continued to find a major 
gulf between social classes within the higher rungs of education.45 The pursued reforms, 
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designed to modernize the education system, nevertheless struggled to keep up with a growing 
population and a growing societal appetite for education.  
 And, despite these shortcomings, the French populace had acquired an insatiable appetite 
for education by the 1960s. A flurry of advertisements in the teen-oriented media, reflecting a 
modernizing France, steered teenagers toward emergent technological industries. Numerous 
schools and training institutes advertised correspondence courses for new career fields, from 
management to technical specialization. “Assure your future,” encouraged one advertisement in 
Salut les copains, inviting readers to familiarize themselves with the field of electronics – the 
“key to the modern world” – through self-taught home courses in either radio or television. The 
advertisement, by Eurélec (the European Institute of Electronics), promised that customers of 
their mail-order courses would become “veritable specialist[s]” in advanced career fields well-
suited for “the year 2000.”46 A similar advertisement by the Centre International d’Etudes par 
Correspondance invited teens to pursue a variety of their courses by mail, which included 
electronics, aviation, industrial chemistry, and refrigeration, ensuring that they provided the tools 
for prosperity and happiness.47 In one issue of Salut les copains from 1966 four different 
companies pushed their own packaged correspondence courses. There was the Ecole Universelle 
offering a “range of modern courses,” for instance, or the Ecole Technique Moyenne et 
Supérieure, which promised that its students would become technicians in “fields of the future” 
that were both “lucrative and without unemployment.”48  
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Magazine editors, like advertisers, understood that their audience would be part of this 
new generation of students looking to the future for careers afforded by France’s modernization 
efforts. Salut les copains, for instance, ran a regular article titled “The Career that I’ve Chosen” 
with the intent of providing its audience a snapshot of the (gendered) professional and technical 
career fields awaiting them. In the articles, young people explained their professions. For males, 
there was Jean-Yves, who detailed his career as a photographer for a monthly magazine; 
Christian, who worked as a printer for Salut les copains; Claude, who worked as a studio 
technician; and Jean-Marc who worked as a rocket technician in France’s inchoate space 
program.49 When asked whether programs existed to learn such skills, Jean-Marc replied that he 
had gone to a technical college “like everyone or almost everyone.”50 For females, careers in 
hospitality, retail, and cosmetics beckoned, as did assistant-level jobs: there was Françoise who 
shared her career as a beautician; Roberte the flight attendant; Marie-Paule, who was a window 
dresser; and Marie-France the secretary, among others.51 Even as the series highlighted other 
careers, mixing the exceptional (racecar driver, writer, ski instructor) with the unglamorous 
(taxicab driver), most of the coverage catered to the fields that were shaping France’s 
consumerist and modernized economy. Collectively, they reflected a France that was 
increasingly corporate and could boast expanded outlets for media, technology, consumption, 
and leisure. 
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Technical and industrial modernization, buttressed by a growing population of educated 
students, was deemed essential to France’s transformation. Also on the Gaullist agenda was the 
fostering of an atmosphere of national unity through apolitical nationalism.52 Since the French 
Revolution, France had been wracked by deep political, social, and ideological cleavages that 
intermittently reared their heads, often with violent consequences. This divide was on full 
display during the Revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848; the Paris Commune; the Dreyfus Affair; 
the fratricide of the Second World War; and, most recently, during the height of the Algerian 
War.53 De Gaulle, always sensitive to these divisions and their effect on French grandeur, hoped 
to quell, or at least minimize, them. The emphasis on national unity was felt in everything from 
the 1958 Fifth Republic constitution to de Gaulle’s grandiose speeches and even governmental 
cultural policy.54 Couched within the language of national unity was also the promise of social 
and political stability, something that had proven elusive during the preceding half century. 
Taken together, a “modern” France in the Gaullist imagination entailed a technologically- and 
economically-advanced nation propelled forward by a population united in a shared goal. With 
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the end of the Algerian War in 1962, this vision took center stage and, given the Gaullists’ solid 
governing majorities, dominated national discourse for a good portion of the decade.  
In general, the stars of yé-yé showed deference to the dominant political order of the early 
Fifth Republic. In a 1963 interview in Salut les copains, Claude François acknowledged that he 
did not have political opinions but followed by saying “I believe I am a Gaullist, by 
conformity.”55 Others embraced the status quo more tacitly. Dick Rivers, for instance, in a 1964 
interview with Salut les copains confirmed that he had a dislike for socialism and believed he 
would not enjoy living in a socialist country, a sentiment no doubt shared by de Gaulle and his 
fellow conservatives.56 Additionally, the major focal points of de Gaulle’s nationalistic foreign 
policy – an insistence on French independence coupled with antagonism towards the U.S.-led 
North Atlantic Treaty Alliance – also found support in yé-yé.57 André Arnaud, for instance, in the 
January 1965 print of his monthly column “Copains flashes,” offered a sympathetic and thorough 
interpretation of de Gaulle’s foreign policy for his teenage readership.58 He explained France’s 
desire for independence following the humiliations of World War II and the reconstruction 
period. He also pointed to the arrogant attitude of the U.S. in pushing its dictates on postwar 
Europe, adding that “the strongest want to become richer and richer, even to the detriment of its 
friends.”59 In a less sophisticated analysis, Johnny Hallyday likewise denounced U.S. foreign 
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policy in Vietnam, adding that he was “altogether in agreement” with the foreign policy of de 
Gaulle’s government.60  
Ultimately though, what made the copain well-suited to the era were not its affinities to 
Gaullism but, to the contrary, its complete absence of political undertones. For social stability 
meant not affiliation with the ruling party, but rather a general reorientation of civic engagement, 
from vehement protest and striking to educational and cultural engagement coupled with passive 
consumption. Unlike much of the popular music that would follow later in the decade, the music 
and idols of yé-yé offered song lyrics and imagery that upheld an inoffensive, middle-class 
ideal.61 In general, the journalists and popular music stars of yé-yé often avoided discussion of 
politics. They were more likely to put forth a generic civic-minded ideal. In an early 1966 issue 
of Formidable, for instance, a picture of Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie Vartan casting their ballots 
was the centerpiece of a brief discussion of the 1965 presidential election.62 Elsewhere, teen idols 
simply dismissed politics, noting their lack of interest.63 Even in their lack of interest, though, the 
yé-yé stars showed deference to the existing political order. All told, from its inception to its 
general decline, no major teen idols or mainstream magazines within yé-yé offered criticism of 
de Gaulle and his influence on France.  
However, the same qualities that allowed the copains to project a confident, forward-
looking nation also served to distance France from its recent colonial past. The end of the 
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Algerian War in 1962 marked a conclusion to what was a reluctant and often bloody retreat from 
empire. Rather than reflect on the recent past, French society seemed content to enjoy the fruits 
of the present, material prosperity and sustained economic growth.64 According to Todd Shepard, 
following the war many in France began to reinterpret decolonization not as a sign of France’s 
inevitable decline but as a marker of progress in what was an unavoidable stage of history.65 
Interpreting decolonization as unavoidable, even necessary, allowed the prevailing historical 
narrative to define France’s former imperialism as little more than an “unfortunate colonial 
detour,” thereby forgetting the central importance the empire in general and Algeria in particular 
had had to France’s identity.66   
Within this historical context the selective remembering found in the yé-yé mass media 
unwittingly lent credence to the belief that France and its colonies had been two separate 
histories all along and that the end of empire had little bearing on the French Republic. Daniel 
Filipacchi, in the first issue of Salut les copains, reflected romantically on the date in 1959 when 
his eponymously-named radio program launched and the young people “in all of France, 
Belgium, and Switzerland” finally gained “their” own radio program.67 What he failed to 
mention, was that the program was also tremendously important to young French soldiers 
serving across the Mediterranean during the brutal Algerian War. During the 8-year conflict 
(1954-1962) over two million draftees served 27-month periods fighting to quell the tide of 
Algerian nationalism. Equipped with transistor radios – an object that proved an inexpensive and 
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popular parting gift for parents to buy their drafted sons – many soldiers spent their idle time 
listening to music transmitted from the metropole. The image of young people, each with their 
own portable radio pressed to their ears and tuned to their favorite stations, was a common sight 
in both metropolitan France and in the barracks across Algeria.68 In neglecting this aspect of 
Salut les copains’ lineage, Filipacchi’s selective recollection, looking more to the future than to 
the past, was emblematic of many in France who were keen to forget France’s colonial past in 
favor of a promising future. To recall the prime importance his program carried, from 1959 
onward, for the conscripts fighting to preserve French Algeria would complicate the narrative of 
France’s blossoming consumer society and economic miracle within the context of European 
economic integration.   
Increased attention to French conscripts stationed in West Germany likewise served to 
erase memories of the Algerian War and the French military’s dubious role in it. Over the course 
of the 1960s, soldiers became recast as agents of peace, not war (or, more euphemistically, as 
was described during the Algerian conflict, “pacification”). Articles written during the period, 
like one in the July 1964 issue of Salut les copains, could boast that it was young French soldiers 
spearheading the nation’s rapprochement with West Germany. André Arnaud, writing for the 
magazine, found that French soldiers were “hosted more and more often” by German families.69 
He immediately extolled all of the ways the young conscripts strengthened national ties: in 
Berlin, some 350 young French soldiers regularly checked up on local German youngsters and 
their parents; in Freiburg, sixty local families regularly welcomed into their homes those soldiers 
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who could not return to France during holidays; in Neustadt, young French soldiers and their 
German peers went out together on weekends; and in Kehl, a group of young artillerymen 
availed themselves to the local hospital to provide much-needed blood transfusions.70 The 
soldiers’ newfound role as rehabilitators of Franco-German relations within the context of 
European integration and the Cold War provided a welcome distraction from their prior role as 
defenders of the French Empire.   
In the mid-1960s, at a time when Algerian War veterans could not receive formal 
recognition for their wartime service, the male teen idols of yé-yé, almost uniformly serving in 
West Germany, bolstered the new perception of the French army.71 Since the Revolution, 
obligatory military service was understood as an integral part of republican citizenship. When 
their terms arrived, teen idols like Eddy Mitchell and Danyel Gérard garnered media attention, 
though none were covered so closely and with as much enthusiasm as Johnny Hallyday. 
Stationed with the Forty-third Infantry Regiment in the small city of Offenburg some 160 miles 
south of the West German capital Bonn, Hallyday began his service on May 8, 1964.72 The 
media relished the opportunity to highlight the singer looking prim in his military fatigues and 
serving the Republic honorably. The July 1964 issue of Salut les copains featured a lengthy 
photo spread of Hallyday in uniform.73 Later in the year, the women’s magazine Marie-Claire 
provided similar coverage. It featured a number of photos of Hallyday interacting, in uniform, 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 19.   
71 For instance, the Fédération Nationale des Anciens Combattants d’Algérie (National Federation of 
Veterans of the Algerian War), established in 1958, could not obtain veterans’ cards for its members until 1974. See 
Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli, 266-268; and Robert Gildea, France since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 33.   
72 Chris Tinker, “Rock and Roll Stardom: Johnny Hallyday,” in John Gaffney and Diana Holmes, eds., 
Stardom in Postwar France (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 87-88.  
73 "Notre Marsouin d’Offenburg,” Salut les copains, July 1964, 64-71.  
69 
 
with locals in recreational activities, from table tennis to bumper cars. “[F]or his comrades and 
young Germans, he’s just a soldier like the others,” the magazine wrote, adding that the youngest 
of Germans “find him admirable.”74 In his own semi-regular article featured in Salut les copains, 
Hallyday boasted about his good behavior.75 Later in the year, the news program Sept jours du 
monde offered for television viewers a lengthy segment on the young singer’s daily routine.76 
During his service, he was not allowed to tour or perform live. He was permitted to record new 
music, however, on the condition that any publicity, such as the album cover of his 1964 record 
Le Pénitencier, feature him in his army uniform.77 Like other teen idols, Hallyday’s stint in 
Offenburg was a boon for the French Army. He became an informal spokesman for the army, 
actively demonstrating an apparent civic-mindedness and a selfless and patriotic duty to the 
nation. 
In metropolitan France, the yé-yé popular culture, by suggesting a tacit racial 
homogeneity, also lent the impression of a France fully disentangled from its former empire and 
its colonial subjects of color. The question of race in France had long been a complex issue. 
Since the French Revolution, republican ideology upheld color-blindness as a crucial element of 
national identity; that “Frenchness,” unlike the German volk, was determined through a shared 
adherence to republican values, not race or ethnicity. However, France’s experience with 
imperialism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries racialized the meaning of 
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national identity. As Tyler Stovall argues, by consequence of its empire, “the fact that most of 
the citizens were white and most of the subjects black and brown meant that the very nature of 
Frenchness was conditioned by race,” thereby laying a foundation for “French identity as white 
identity.”78  
The yé-yé popular culture emphasized this implicit assumption at a time when other 
important cultural signifiers, like the popular comic Astérix, unwittingly spoke to France’s 
supposed racial homogeneity.79 The idealized copain – personified by teen idols and portrayed in 
advertisements – was almost uniformly white. This lent subtle credence to the Gaullist notion of 
a unified nation prosperous and newly decolonized. However, it served to mask France’s 
increasingly diverse racial complexion and, in the process, marginalize a growing immigrant 
population, many of whom hailed from France’s former colonies. As early as World War I, 
immigrants, usually from within the French Empire, were actively courted to fulfill various labor 
needs and to compensate for tepid population growth. Among subjects from the empire, Arab 
Algerians in particular constituted a major portion of colonial migration. In the decades 
surrounding the Algerian War, a large influx of Algerian immigrants entered into metropolitan 
France. Though official estimates fluctuated greatly, there were around 300,000 Algerian 
                                                 
78 Tyler Stovall, “National Identity and Shifting Imperial Frontiers: Whiteness and the Exclusion of 
Colonial Labor after World War I,” Representations 84, no. 1 (November 2003): 54.  
79 The case of Astérix was interesting. Created in 1959, the comic followed the exploits of two ancient 
Gaulois named Astérix and Obélix. By making its two protagonists hail from ancient Gaul the comic suggested, if in 
light-hearted fashion, a mythic and unadulterated French past. As other historians assert, during the 1960s and 
1970s, the comic actually critiqued, if subtly, instances of racial injustice and discrimination towards immigrants in 
France. At the same time though, the comic, in its use of humor, relied on familiar racist stereotypes and a discourse 
of racial difference. On this, see Henri-Simon Blanc-Hoàng, “Antiquity and Bandes Dessinées: Schizophrenic 
Nationalism between Atlanticisim and Marxism,” in Annessa Ann Babic, ed., Comics as History, Comics as 
Literature: Roles of the Comic Book in Scholarship, Society, and Entertainment (Lanham, MD: Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press, 2014), 18-19.  
71 
 
immigrants living in France before the Algerian War, the vast majority of whom were working, 
single males.80 For a number of reasons, they commonly settled in enclaves on the periphery of 
French cities, often in shantytowns and other equally squalid conditions. As a result, they often 
went unseen, rendered invisible by their geographic and social marginalization.81 The irony was 
that it was the population of ethnic immigrants, mostly from former colonies, who occupied 
many of the low-level and laborious industrial jobs that helped propel France’s economic 
growth, despite the fact that they were often omitted from the national portrait of a prosperous, 
decolonized France.82 
Despite the diverse complexion of France’s population, particularly given the role of 
immigration from former colonies, racial and ethnic minorities were seldom represented in the 
yé-yé popular culture. Few performers of color achieved stardom in the world of yé-yé and those 
that did found only fleeting success. The handful of performers all hailed from France’s former 
colonies. There was Les Surfs, a six-person musical group comprised of a family of four brothers 
and two sisters. Coming from Madagascar, they recorded French-language versions of American 
hits in a style similar to girl-group pop in the United States.83 Another star who achieved short-
lived commercial success was Tiny Yong, a Vietnamese-born singer whose only major hit was 
the single “Tais-Toi, Petite Folle” (“Hush Yourself, Crazy Little Girl”).84 When she was 
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portrayed in the media, articles commonly emphasized her “exotic” Asian qualities in a way that 
purposefully differentiated her from the more familiar copains like Sheila or Claude François. 
One article in Age tendre et tête de bois, suggestively titled “Yellow Peril,” introduced Yong 
alongside another, ultimately less successful Vietnamese performer named Bach Yen. Calling 
the girls “two kimonos in the country of blue jeans,” the accompanying photo spread showed the 
stars in ostensibly authentic Asian clothing and posing nearby, among other things, a statue of 
Buddha and a decorative vase depicting oriental imagery.85 These staged photos contrasted the 
actual text of the article, which described Yong as “the more Western of the two” singers, a girl 
who regularly frequented the Latin Quarter of Paris and “always dresses like a European.”86 
Despite fitting the same criteria as contemporary, white pop stars (sharing the same interests, 
musical tastes, and fashion sensibilities), the magazine nevertheless made a special point to 
accentuate her “otherness.”            
The governing assumption of racial difference that underlay the yé-yé mass media and its 
representations of youth was part of a larger articulation of adolescence in the early Fifth 
Republic. In general, the ideal copain was defined in the mass media as white, middle class, and 
urban; a subscriber to France’s program of modernization in all its dimensions. For one, the 
prototypical copain was a student. Education was a centerpiece of the modernization efforts 
championed by France’s political and technocratic elite of the era. The yé-yé popular culture, in 
assuming the student ideal, both reflected and rationalized France’s postwar project of 
technological and industrial advancement. At the same time, the copain assumed an apolitical 
and vaguely nationalistic stance, one that echoed, if faintly, the rhetoric of unity and inclusivity 
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that dominated Gaullist political discourse of the period. Its “universal” definition of youth was 
nevertheless highly selective. It served to render invisible groups that did not fit comfortably into 
its vision of modern France. In asserting the primacy of the middle-class student ideal, yé-yé 
masked the ongoing disparities of the French education system, particularly for teens of 
agricultural or working class backgrounds. Additionally, the idealized copain, as represented in 
the media, was almost uniformly white. In the immediate aftermath of France’s withdrawal from 
empire, the copain lent the appearance of racial and ethnic homogeneity within the Hexagon at 
the expense of the vast populations that until only recently made up the subjects of the French 
Empire and that represented a large immigrant population in France. Altogether, the copain, in 
its definition of youth, articulated an idealized vision of a modernized and unified France 
detached from its colonial past, one that nevertheless downplayed ongoing social inequalities.  
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CHAPTER 3: YOUTH AND CONSUMPTION DURING LES ANNÉES YÉ-
YÉ, 1962-1966 
 In a May 1964 issue of Life, American readers were introduced to France’s three most 
famous young female singers, Sylvie Vartan, Françoise Hardy, and Sheila. The magazine 
described them in terms its audience could understand: “What the Beatles are to England, the 
singing Yé-Yé girls are to France.”1 Like the Beatles, these young French singers were products 
of America’s influence on European popular culture; their tastes, appearances, and the musical 
style in which they performed were all indebted (either directly or indirectly) to American 
precedents. By 1964, the cultural currents that had drifted across the Atlantic were projected 
back on the United States. The context in which French singers like Vartan and Hardy were 
understood by American audiences was not music, but fashion. The Life article suggested as 
much, with its coverage focused on the three singers’ clothing choices, keeping information 
about their musical careers to a minimum. The article eagerly mentioned that the three singers 
are “so popular that Yé-Yé clothes and Yé-Yé hairdos are sprouting all over France,” assuring its 
readers that “young Americans who want to look like them will find they already have, or can 
soon buy, most of the ingredients.”2 Significantly, while these young singers became the latest 
paragons of a long-vaunted Paris fashion, they did so through the wearing of relatively 
inexpensive and mass-produced ready-to-wear clothing.   
 For readers across the Atlantic, these young singers were the embodiment of a remade 
France, one fully transformed into a society of mass consumerism. Yé-yé, perhaps more than any 
other force in the mid-1960s, defined what it meant to be young in France, and it did so in direct 
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relation to the emergent system of mass consumption. The very idea of youth became interwoven 
with an all-encompassing consumer culture. Certainly, a number of scholarly works have already 
detailed the postwar “economic miracle” that gave rise to a particular type of advanced consumer 
capitalism in France (and Western Europe as a whole). This chapter examines the way the 
copains of yé-yé reflected that change, stripping the exceptional newness of many aspects of the 
consumer society to instead present them as ordinary, fully-integrated, and expected parts of 
everyday life. Rather than focus on consumer society in the abstract, this chapter examines the 
copains’ relationship to two specific commodities: the personal vehicle (the automobile and the 
motor scooter) and ready-to-wear clothing. Though many other consumer durables would have 
sufficed, the car and ready-made clothing provide, each in their own way, practical examples of 
how France navigated the coming of mass consumer society.          
The rise of yé-yé coincided with a broad rationalization of mass consumerism in France.3 
The 1960s marked the decade when the full implications of a society of “mass” (mass 
consumerism, mass culture, mass media, etc.) entered into national consciousness, finding 
expression in fiction, social scientific studies, and among the polemics of public intellectuals.4 At 
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the state level, with the advent of the Fifth Republic in 1958 and the return of Charles de Gaulle, 
the efforts at economic modernization begun under the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) continued 
with vigor and an increased political importance. The notion of economic and industrial 
modernization fit squarely into the larger Gaullist quest to restore French grandeur.5 De Gaulle 
envisioned, as part of his effort to restore French prestige and international influence, a strong 
and modernized economy, particularly with the end of France’s empire looming. Alongside a 
strong economy, the material well-being and standard of living of French citizens also became a 
metric for French grandeur. Leading Gaullists like Michel Debré wrote about the role of material 
comforts in the larger project of France’s renewal and de Gaulle himself liked to boast that 
“never before has the average standard of living of the French people been so high.”6    
The newfound significance of consumption trickled all the way down to French 
adolescents. Nowhere was this more evident than in a 1965 government publication, the 
optimistically-titled France and the Rising Generation. The document, published in English by 
the French Embassy in New York, offered American audiences an idealized view of France’s 
youth. Though its representation of French teenagers was highly selective, it was nevertheless 
telling what criteria the government decided to tout. On the first pages, the reader was 
bombarded by a flurry of figures venerating the population growth provided by France’s baby 
boom generation and, with it, the young generation’s growing economic clout in a world of 
consumption: 
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  Today France has a youth market with independent buying power. For 
instance, the 15 to 20 age group accounts for four million consumers and 
spends close to $1 billion each year: 58% of this group is already working 
and is free to spend its extra money as it sees fit; 43% of France's students 
supplement their allowances by working part-time. It is now quite common 
to give children allowances, and they have more freedom to use them as they 
please.  
 … They buy clothing, sporting goods, musical instruments, books and 
newspapers, radios and records. Many want to own their own motorscooters 
or cars, which they consider a sign of independence; about 8% of all young 
men and 7% of all young women own cars by age 20.7  
 
These consumer desires, the document insisted, helped ensure the continued success of France:  
This postwar generation is already a factor in the transformation which will 
give France a new face by 1985. Realistic, anxious to better its living 
standards, interested in modern technology, concerned with personal, family, 
and occupational success, today's French youth follows close behind a 
generation of young adults who are already playing a greater part in the 
country's economic and social life than their predecessors did at the same age. 
These two generations - the one now entering the labor force and the other 
already part of it - are those that will shape the France of 1985.8 
 
 What made these proclamations all the more significant was how starkly they contrasted a 
similar publication produced six years earlier, a 1959 book called The Young Face of France.9 
Like France and the Rising Generation, the governmentally-produced book immediately 
extolled the country’s revitalized birthrate while enumerating a number of adolescent 
accomplishments that would assuredly bring success to France. However, unlike its predecessor, 
which made adolescent consumption its first point of emphasis, the document contained no 
mention of consumerism or teenager’s economic contribution to the nation.  
 The changing perception between 1959 and 1965 of teenage consumption underscored 
the rapidity with which mass consumerism and mass culture inserted themselves into the 
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everyday lives of French people during the period. Within the context of state-led modernization 
efforts following World War II, mass consumption occupied an increasingly important place as a 
driver of the French economy. Consumption had long been a gendered endeavor.10 In the 
postwar setting, women in particular found a new civic role as consumers for the good of both 
their families and the nation.11 Though their roles were never nearly as well-defined, teenage 
boys and girls too became vital pieces in France’s consumer economy. Due to its sheer 
popularity, yé-yé was essential to this changing role of teenage consumption and it is perhaps not 
coincidental that the French government began putting a positive spin on youth consumerism in 
1965, right at a time when the phenomenon had reached its apogee.  
The Automobile  
In its representation of youth, the yé-yé popular culture reserved a special place for the 
automobile (or, as was often the case, motor scooters). The car’s presence in advertisements, 
magazine articles, and elsewhere presumed its importance to the modern adolescent experience 
and, as such, reflected in vivid, symbolic terms the extent of France’s consumer revolution. It 
was during the 1950s and 1960s that the automobile arguably served as the symbol of France’s 
postwar modernization efforts: the automobile industry was instrumental in the reinvention of the 
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French economy, the car itself became a major component in the reconfiguration of France’s 
social and urban landscapes, and it became the ultimate prize in an ever-expanding consumer 
society. Both physically and metaphorically, the car was a key driver in France’s postwar 
transformation; its eventual omnipresence embodied the spirit of France’s transition from a rural, 
largely agricultural, and empire-oriented nation to one that was urbanized, decolonized, and fully 
shaped by the defining cues of late capitalism.12   
With the spectacular growth of personal automobile ownership in the 1950s and 1960s, it 
is easy to forget that France actually emerged as an early leader in the international automobile 
industry thanks to the pioneering efforts of figures like Armand Peugeot, the Renault brothers, 
and Edouard and André Michelin, among others. During the automobile’s infancy in the 1890s, 
France was the foremost producer of automobiles; only in 1906 did the United States surpass it 
in total quantity produced, and even then the country remained the largest exporter of vehicles in 
the world until World War I and remained the largest producer of automobiles in Europe until 
the 1930s.13 In the 1920s, French automakers began incorporating various Fordist strategies to 
varying degrees of success in an effort to increase production. During the decade, the industry 
became consolidated, with the “Big Three” – Peugeot, Renault, and Citroën – occupying 63% of 
the domestic market share.14 The economic depression of the 1930s eroded France’s dominant 
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position on the continent, as both British and German automotive output surpassed it along the 
course of the decade.15  
 It was only in the postwar period that French automakers truly embraced practices of 
mass production. In the process, they contributed to the revitalization of France’s economy. 
Alongside other important industrial sectors, the auto industry offered persuasive evidence of the 
“economic miracle” reshaping the Hexagon. It was a key sector in which the French government 
intervened with state-led planning efforts in the immediate years following the liberation and the 
subsequent end of World War II.16 In the Fifth Republic, the Gaullist state deemed it a priority to 
prepare the French economy for heightened international competition and trade, particularly with 
the process of European economic integration underway. The solution was the creation of large, 
French-owned corporations capable of competing on an international level. The auto industry 
was at the forefront of these governmentally-endorsed efforts to consolidate French enterprises 
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through calculated corporate mergers meant to increase competitiveness. As a result, by the early 
1970s only four companies – Renault, Citroën, Peugeot, and Simca – controlled France’s auto 
production.17 
 More than an economic boon, the personal vehicle also carried symbolic importance, 
particularly for France’s new technocratic, salaried middle class. It became, as Jean-Pierre Rioux 
suggests, an “instantly recognizable symbol of material well-being, one whose appeal was 
universal,” and which served to enhance both work and leisure.18 For a growing crop of middle-
class cadres, the personal automobile, alongside suburbanized homes, household appliances, and 
other consumer products, became a visible component of the new middle class identity.19 
Advertisements in popular magazines like L’Express solidified the relationship between the car 
and bourgeois consumption. Likewise, popular yé-yé magazines, whose readership encompassed 
France’s urban middle-class youth, advertisements consciously linked the automobile to 
bourgeois notions of individualism and success. Depictions of vehicles in motion became 
metaphors for freedom, as advertisements suggested that automobile ownership and happiness 
were inextricably linked. In a 1966 issue of Salut les copains, an advertisement by Honda 
declared that its line of sporty mopeds were “for those who win.”20 The accompanying photo of a 
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trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 140-141.    
 20 “Honda: Pour ceux qui gagnent,” Salut les copains, April 1966, 17.  
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smartly dressed young man with a pretty girl riding on the back left no doubt about the criteria 
for victory. Another in Salut les copains, this time for the Peugeot BB3 Sport moped, announced 
simply “comme ça!” (“just like that!”), its illustration appropriately conveying the message of 
success and happiness built around middle class consumption.21 The various advertisements 
served to solidify the automobile’s link to the modern middle class identity.   
Though actual ownership was limited among teenagers, the automobile’s frequent 
coverage in yé-yé magazines made it clear that the copains were expected to think about 
automobiles and the day when they would eventually acquire one. To point to one example, an 
article in the May 1964 issue of Twenty offered readers a helpful guide to buying affordably-
priced used cars.22 The magazine Formidable, meanwhile, reserved a prominent space for 
automobiles in its “news” section; its inaugural issue in October 1965 spotlighted the new 
Citroën DS 21.23 In ever-increasing frequency, advertisements similarly affirmed the importance 
of the automobile to modern life.24 They consciously played upon the apparent youthfulness of 
certain automobiles in an effort to appeal to their teenage readership. One promoted the new 
Ford Cortina Lotus, a “speed demon,” and its budget-friendly counterpart, the Ford Anglia, 
concluding that “finally, an automobile of youth, for young people.”25 A similar advertisement 
for the Renault R4 featured the pop star Sheila standing joyously at the open door of the car, 
                                                 
 21 “Peugeot BB3 Sport,” Salut les copains, April 1963, 82.   
 22 “La Coté des Voitures Twenty,” Twenty, May 1964, 116-117. 
 23 “Formidable actualités: Les événements du mois,” Formidable, October 1965, 6.  
 24 From the 1950s and 1960s, France’s major automakers expanded their advertising campaigns with the 
hope of stimulating growth in the automotive sector. In particular, they targeted print media; as late as 1979, the 
combined automakers still devoted 79% of advertising budgets to print media. This statistic comes from Patrick 
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calling it “love at first sight between two copines.”26 “What I like in the R4,” Sheila confessed, 
“is its youth.”27 The reality though, despite the appetite for automobiles among young people, 
was that a car was out of reach for many teenagers, due to both the cost and the required age of 
eighteen before being eligible to obtain a driver’s license. A more viable option was the moped 
or motorized scooter, and advertisers used the same language of happiness to encourage their 
integration into daily life. An advertisement by the moped producer Motobécane for instance 
depicted a girl, hair in the wind and smile uncontained, alongside a promise that “she is happy, 
her life is easier” with their product, the Mobylette.28 Even if advertisements, in their promise of 
happiness and success at the wheel of a car, offered transparent marketing ploys, they 
nevertheless insisted upon with stunning regularity the centrality of the automobile to the modern 
adolescent experience. The automobile’s saturation of media had its desired effect: by 1966, as 
one survey found, one out of every two French teens dreamed of owning their own car.29    
The automobile’s presence went beyond advertisements though. Entering into cultural 
expressions, it became mythologized by intellectuals and in literature and film. It was imagined 
not simply as a means for transportation but as a venerable mobile extension of the domestic 
sphere, its cabin enshrined with the same sense of intimacy and privacy as the home.30 This 
mythology was extended to and reinforced by the teen idols of yé-yé. In the first issue of Age 
tendre et tête de bois, an article highlighted how stardom had affected Johnny Hallyday, the 
                                                 
 26 “… jolie petite Sheila … jolie petite R4, coup de foudre entre deux copines!,” Salut les copains, May 
1963, 19.    
27 Ibid., 19.   
28 “Elle est heureuse, sa vie est plus facile avec Mobylette,” Salut les copains, May 1965, 21.   
 29 Anne-Marie Sohn, Age tendre et tête de bois: Histoire des jeunes des années 1960 (Paris: Hachette, 
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preeminent star of the era.31 The performer was beset with sadness, the article noted, finding that 
celebrity had deprived him of privacy, undermined his closest friendships, and imposed on him 
unfair public expectations. Finding that he could not even walk outside alone in privacy 
anymore, the singer turned to his automobile, a sleek Jaguar. “He enters into his car, his unique 
kingdom where others can’t enter” the article read, “and in this steel cage, where he 
paradoxically rediscovers his liberty, he forgets [his problems] at 190 [kilometers] per hour.”32      
The car likewise came to signify a vital means for relaxation in a society of growing 
leisure. The combination of rising affluence and generous state-secured paid vacations led to an 
increased appetite for mass vacationing and mass tourism in the 1960s. Rising automobile 
ownership, supplemented by the vast improvement of France’s highway network, meant that 
French families took to the road with increased regularity to satisfy their vacationing needs.33 In 
the process, the car acquired a certain romantic quality. As Ellen Furlough writes, “both 
vacations and cars could signify mythic escape, personal autonomy, and displacement in time 
and space.”34 It made sense, then, that when in mid-1965 the entertainment magazine Paris 
Match caught up with the newlywed celebrity couple of Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie Vartan 
amid their honeymoon, the car factored prominently into the image of tranquil escapism crafted 
by the magazine. The article opened with a large, colorful photo of the couple seated 
comfortably in an open-top convertible. Hallyday, sitting behind the wheel, looked on casually, 
his arm perched on the driver’s side door. His wife, Vartan, gazed off into the sky, as the scene’s 
                                                 
31 “Johnny est malheureux,” Age tendre et tête de bois, January 1963, 13.   
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backdrop trailed off onto the image of a sunbaked city ensconced in palm trees and vineyards. 
The bucolic setting represented a symbolic reprieve from the rigors of modern life. The irony, of 
course, was that it was the car, the ultimate symbol of modernity, which made this retreat 
possible. The journalists noted that, despite the couple’s efforts to find solitude, “a reporter is 
always there to photograph the petite MG that they had rented.” “Often” the article continued, 
the couple “roams the roads in search of isolated beaches.”35 The discussion of their travels and 
their search for solitude invariably revolved around the automobile and the open road, two 
touchstones of the modern consumer tourist fantasy.     
For all its popularity though, the automobile also served as a stark reminder of France’s 
uneasy search for an acceptable mass consumerist identity distinct from but nevertheless in the 
shadow of the postwar American hegemon. In popular culture from the era, the conspicuously-
placed American-made automobile served as a symbol, a subtle reminder of the near-hegemonic 
role of the United States in spreading cultural products and business practices in the postwar 
period.36 The car signified, for good or for bad, a vision of American consumer modernity; a 
product that represented the fast-paced, materialistic society that, in the French imagination, 
defined America. Cultural references during the period retained a marked ambivalence about 
US’s apparent influence on postwar France. From Françoise Sagan’s 1954 bestselling novel 
Bonjour tristesse to Jean-Luc Godard’s 1960 New Wave masterpiece A bout de souffle 
(Breathless), American-made automobiles provided convenient plot devices, alternating between 
                                                 
35 François Luizet and J.-P. Biot, “Le grand bonheur qu’elle avait voulu cacher,” Paris-Match, April 24, 
1965, 94-95.   
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objects of desire and tragedy.37 In popular music, the lyrics of provocative singer Serge 
Gainsbourg’s 1968 song “Ford Mustang” featured a litany of references to pop culture and 
consumer products (Coca Cola, Kool cigarettes, and Zippo lighters) as well as a sprinkling of 
spoken English words, an apparent recognition America’s cultural omnipresence in postwar 
France.38    
Within the context of the yé-yé popular culture, America likewise provided a familiar 
point of reference. The young pop stars of yé-yé often brandished their large American-made 
cars as a symbol of their success. Unlike other voices in French society, however, these yé-yé 
singers made no effort to provide social commentary on the apparent “Americanization” of 
France. Instead, as representatives of a postwar baby-boom generation coming of age in an 
affluent society of consumption, yé-yé pop stars appropriated the connotations of the American 
auto, themselves becoming symbols of France’s mass consumer transformation. For the teenage 
pop stars, harbingers of a buoyant consumer modernity, the car served as a venerable extension 
of their public identity. Richard Anthony, the singer of “J’entends Siffler le Train” (“I Hear the 
Train Whistling”), for instance, was regularly pictured with his “enormous American car,” as he 
was in a 1962 special issue of Disco revue international.39 An article in the May 1963 issue of 
Age tendre et tête de bois, finding that “all the boys already have their car,” offered a colorful 
spread of famous teen idols like Danny Boy and Vince Taylor flaunting their vehicles.40 One star 
                                                 
37 See Françoise Sagan, Bonjour Tristesse, trans. Irene Ash (New York: Harper Collins, 2008); and 
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discussion of Serge Gainsbourg’s lyrical subject matter in relation to Americanization, see Chris Tinker, “Serge 
Gainsbourg and Le Défi américain,” Modern & Contemporary France 10, no. 2 (2002): 187-196. 
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was shown leaping jubilantly from his Ford Thunderbird convertible, another sitting comfortably 
in his large Buick. Not to be outdone, Claude François was captured bounding above his open 
top Thunderbird convertible, the caption below reading “la belle Américaine.” The montage of 
car photos echoed similar articles in other magazines from the era,41 underscoring the significant 
role of the automobile, in this case American, as both a desired commodity and an extension of 
the teen idol’s identity.42 
Ready-to-Wear Fashion  
Just as the transformation in automobility announced the arrival of a mass consumer 
modernity in France, so too did changing fashion sensibilities. Over the course of a decade, from 
the 1950s to the 1960s, a major shift occurred in French fashion. Though Paris emerged from 
war battered, the likes of Christian Dior and his “New Look,” introduced in 1947, firmly 
reestablished France’s credentials as the world leader of elite fashion. By the late 1950s, though, 
tastes began to shift from the haute couture of old to new lines of ready-made, mass-produced 
clothing. Rising consumer demand led to an increased appetite for clothing that was both 
affordable and fashionable. By the 1960s, prêt-à-porter (ready-to-wear) became a significant 
force in dictating fashion sensibilities. Young people had a vital role to play in this shift: as they 
gained an increasingly prominent role as consumers in the French economy, they began exerting 
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pressure on designers and retailers to produce fashions that were new, fresh, and modern. 
Designers and department stores alike proved quick to appease them, introducing chic ready-to-
wear clothing lines that captured the youthful spirit of an emergent baby-boom generation. The 
leading stars of yé-yé served as beacons of the shift from the ritzy attire of haute couture to 
trendy ready-made clothing ensembles. Through it all, the Parisian fashion industry had to 
readjust to changing tastes and the democratization of fashion, all while attempting to preserve 
its illustrious status as the world’s leader of fashion.   
Paris had long fancied itself as the global center of fashion, particularly women’s fashion. 
The city became renowned for its haute couture, an industry of high fashion that produced 
custom-fitted, luxurious clothing for the wealthy elite. Haute couture, broadly speaking, referred 
to the highly recognizable fashion houses that garnered not only national attention, but 
international attention too. In the twentieth century, for instance, Coco Chanel dominated fashion 
during the interwar years while the likes of Christian Dior and Pierre Cardin shaped tastes and 
sensibilities after World War II.43 Although the industry often served as a symbol of French 
national identity, it took on special resonance in the immediate decades following the Second 
World War. The fashion houses conjured notions of quality, sophistication, tradition, and taste 
while simultaneously acting as emblems of France. For a French nation in search of reinvention 
in the wake of war, high fashion provided a way to assert identity on the international stage. In 
other words, as some have argued, if France proved unable to exercise military or diplomatic 
influence in the bipolar, rigid Cold War paradigm, it could at least be a leading cultural influence 
                                                 
 43 For a general history, see Valerie Steele, Paris Fashion: A Cultural History (Oxford: Oxford University 
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in the world.44 This partly explains the government’s bolstering of the Haute Couture industry in 
the postwar period – particularly the largest fashion houses – which included not only financial 
support but also sponsorship of major fashion events as well as the procurement of essential raw 
materials that were otherwise in short supply.45  
At the other end of the spectrum rested confection, an industry that created mass-
produced, inexpensive clothing that did not require personalized measurements. Made possible 
by the industrial revolution, confection, or ready-made clothing, became increasingly prevalent 
during the nineteenth century. While it conquered the market for men’s clothing by the turn of 
the twentieth century, its incursion into women’s clothing proved slower by comparison.46 Part 
of the industry’s problem was perceptional in that it was associated with poor quality and equally 
poor taste. If haute couture represented the sophistication of artisanal quality, confection 
embodied the apparent shortcomings of a society of mass production and consumption. The 
reputation of women’s ready-to-wear clothing began improving in the interwar years, thanks to a 
gradual improvement of prefabricated goods, though it still lagged far behind couture. In this 
way, the assumptions about confection – that genuine artistic quality was incompatible with 
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modes of mass production and consumption – were indicative of France’s larger ambivalence 
about the gradual rise of mass consumer society.  
The 1950s was a pivotal moment in the French fashion industry. It was during this decade 
that ready-to-wear fashion made significant gains at the expense of haute couture. On some 
level, the fashion houses of haute couture faced something of an identity crisis as they tried to 
keep pace with not only the high production of ready-to-wear, but also changing consumer tastes. 
To be sure, in the world of fashion haute couture reigned supreme for a good part of the decade; 
the introduction of Christian Dior’s “New Look” in 1947 – slim cinched waistlines, longer skirt 
lengths, softened shoulders, and with it the accentuation of the female silhouette, a look that was 
simultaneously refreshing and nostalgic – set the new trend for women’s fashion and 
reestablished Paris’ reputation as the center of global fashion.47 However, rising purchasing 
power among a growing and insatiable demographic of middle-class consumers brought with it a 
greater demand for accessible fashion. Their desire for stylish yet affordable clothing led to a 
democratization of fashion; no longer was fashion the preserve of the wealthy few, a marker of 
distinction, but instead an object of mass consumption, a commodity supposedly available to all.  
What role did young people play in this transition? As teenagers acquired disposable 
income, they began to exert pressure on the consumer market, shaping tastes in the process. Over 
the course of ten years, between 1953 and 1963-1964, teenagers’ expenditures on clothing grew 
at a phenomenal rate (131% for girls, 103% for boys).48 A 1963 survey by the Institut national de 
la statistique et des études économiques found that, for the first time in history, the 15-20 year 
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old age group spent far more on clothing than any other age category. Importantly, young people 
had little appetite for the haute couture of days past. What at one time seemed refined and 
sophisticated had become elitist and ill-suited for the demands of the modern life.49 Their taste in 
fashion was not only built in opposition to older generations, but was cosmopolitan in its nature. 
The mini-skirt, after all, probably the single most iconic fashion symbol of the 1960s baby-
boomer generation, had its origins in London, not Paris.50   
Both fashion retailers and designers recognized the changing tide of fashion and quickly 
sought to accommodate the tastes of young people. The line between haute couture and ready-
made clothing began to blur, as a new type of ready-made fashion, prêt-à-porter, began adopting 
the same ethos of quality long linked to high fashion. During the 1950s, the major Paris 
department stores began an aggressive push to rebrand themselves. The Galeries Lafayette, for 
instance, teamed with esteemed ready-to-wear designers like Michèle Rosier and Emmanuelle 
Khanh to produce its own unique fashion lines independent of the couture houses. Both Galeries 
Lafayette and Printemps, vying for young consumers, introduced departments devoted 
exclusively to teenage girls, eagerly advertising these new additions to their respective stores.51 
At the same time, some of the major fashion designers of the 1960s, including Yves Saint 
Laurent and André Courrèges introduced relatively affordable, ready-made clothing lines meant 
to capture the youthful spirit of the times. Saint Laurent himself acknowledged that “the young 
lead very different lives from the lives of women who wear couture fashion. Not all of the young 
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would want couture even if they could afford the price.” He concluded that "Couturiers, haute 
couture, la mode – they’re all terms that are out-dated."52 
The popular stars of yé-yé helped drive the shift toward ready-to-wear, as the 
phenomenon’s leading female singers proved capable fashion tastemakers. In setting trends for 
adolescent style, they pushed ready-to-wear fashion to the forefront while providing a vibrant 
image of a consumerist France. Brigitte Bardot, who had famously remarked that couture was for 
grandmothers, had already made ready-made clothing a key component to her look.53 Building 
on Bardot’s precedent, the various yé-yé girls brought the connection between youth and ready-
to-wear to new heights. Each star – Sylvie Vartan, Françoise Hardy, Sheila, Gillian Hills, 
Michèle Torr, and others – had their own distinct though readily-copied look, which allowed 
teenage girls to imitate the idol of their choosing. Their fashion tastes were on full display on 
record sleeves and in photos and magazines.54 Yé-yé magazines popular among teenage girls 
helped stoke the desire for clothing through unceasing coverage and analysis of the latest tastes 
and trends. For instance, the magazine Mademoiselle âge tendre routinely featured prominent 
sections on fashion, all of the ready-to-wear variety, encouraging teenage consumers to adopt the 
latest styles.   
The April 1965 issue was a prime example. In one article the magazine spotlighted 
Françoise Hardy, sharing “the six outfits from her wardrobe that she likes to wear the most.”55 
Over the next several pages, a series of photos showed the young singer posed in a number of 
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affected positions. The outfits on display encompassed everything from airy springtime wears 
and stylish sleeping gowns to a space-age plastic dress. Her wardrobe apparently even contained 
a full “Beatles ensemble,” from the iconic collarless grey suit to the Italian boots.56 In the same 
issue, Michèle Torr served as the model for a spread of attires deemed “le style garcon,” which 
included stylish pairings of jeans and pants alongside casual pullovers, button-up shirts, and 
tank-tops. Alongside the clothing, readers were encouraged to visit major Parisian department 
stores like Printemps and the Galeries Lafayette to purchase affordable copies of their own.57 In 
the following month’s issue, Mademoiselle âge tendre introduced an article that offered a full 
outfit, modeled by one of the popular singers, which girls could procure themselves. The 
inaugural article introduced a casual-looking Gillian Hills in a skirt and flowery blouse. 
Conscious of their aim to encourage the purchase of clothing, the editors indicated that the 
carefully-chosen outfit was “at a price specially studied to agree with the greatest number of 
girls.”58  
The significance of prêt-à-porter came from the fact that it made ready-made clothing a 
legitimate fashion alternative that, if not gaining parity, at least rivaled the products of the haute 
couture industry. A couple of key factors helped elevate ready-to-wear. For one, women’s 
magazines played a vital role. Starting in the 1950s, they recast the image of ready-made 
clothing in an effort to shake the reputation of poor quality that had plagued confection. 
Magazines like Elle coupled the language of sophistication previously linked to haute couture 
with an emphasis on ready-made’s practical qualities that were well-attuned to the demands of 
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modern life. Even the invented term prêt-à-porter – a literal translation of “ready-to-wear” – was 
deployed by marketers and periodicals with the intent of differentiating newer ready-made 
clothing products from their poorly-received predecessors.59 Teen idols like Françoise Hardy and 
Sylvie Vartan regularly found themselves on the cover and in featured articles. Vartan for 
instance, in a February 1964 issue of Elle, embodied the modern girl in need of modern clothing. 
She modeled three sleek raincoats. “Leading a very active life, Sylvie searches for chic things, 
[which are] easy to put on and that ‘hold up’ [tiennent le coup],” the magazine wrote.60 Hardy, 
meanwhile, made the cover of a December 1963 issue of Elle. In the issue, she modeled three 
stylish ready-to-wear outfits. Her influence was clear: "thanks to Françoise," the article read, 
"beauty is possibly going to have new dimensions."61 As designer ready-made clothes, the attire 
worn by the pop stars was often no doubt more expensive than something off the rack of a 
department store, but they were still far cheaper than their custom-measured predecessors and 
nevertheless represented a sharp departure from earlier fashion sensibilities.      
 Secondly, the improved image of ready-to-wear clothing came through the rise of 
boutiques. Boutiques, different than both large department stores and exclusive fashion houses, 
offered a new way to distribute ready-made clothing. As an outgrowth of a society increasingly 
based around consumption and leisure, they went hand-in-hand with the rise of youth-oriented, 
mass-produced clothing. Three boutiques opened in 1954 along the Left Bank of Paris, each 
launching their own prêt-à-porter lines. By the 1960s boutiques were a full-fledged 
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phenomenon, with some of the most renowned outlets of the decade including Hit Parade, JNS3, 
Knap, Penthouse, La Machinerie, and Dorothée Bis.62 Even the leading teen idols of yé-yé 
partook. The young singer Sheila, whose giddy persona belied her keen business acumen, cashed 
in on the craze, opening the “Boutique Sheila” along the Rue des Jeûneurs in Paris’ Second 
Arrondissement.63 The boutiques employed a number of novel strategies to create the optimal 
atmosphere for the sale of clothing. Their in-store decorations, carefully-selected background 
music, window displays, and floorplans were all devised to pique consumer interest, lure in 
passersby shoppers, and encourage spending. They conscientiously hired teenage girls, who 
could speak the requisite parlance, in an effort to attract a similar, like-minded clientele. They 
also swapped out their products on a seasonal basis to encourage immediate spending and 
repeated visits. Importantly, though, the boutiques typically maintained small commercial spaces 
that differentiated them from vast supermarkets and department stores while giving their clothing 
an air of exclusivity and sophistication.64  
While the yé-yé girls helped legitimize ready-to-wear in France, the way they were 
perceived abroad, particularly in the United States, offered further evidence about how the nature 
of French fashion had changed. The U.S. and Parisian fashion had a long and checkered history. 
Wealthy Americans were among the foreign elite who routinely bought the latest from Paris’ 
fashion houses, and they played a particularly important role in reviving the industry after World 
War II when demand for luxury clothing was dampened elsewhere. At the same time, though, 
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New York had begun to rival Paris as a leader in fashion design, particularly in the domain of 
mass-produced ready-to-wear clothing. The postwar shift toward ready-to-wear in France, it 
could be argued, was partly a response to mounting pressure exerted from across the Atlantic.65 
Despite America’s influence on postwar fashion, though, France still retained a privileged 
position in the American imagination, even in spite of the general shift away from traditional 
haute couture.   
This was evident in coverage from the period where, for American observers, the yé-yé 
girls, outfitted in the latest prêt-à-porter, remained the personification of chic Paris fashion. As 
the Life article introduced earlier in the chapter made clear, American audiences understood the 
copines of yé-yé not for their music but for their embodiment of trendy French fashion. The New 
York Times, for instance, examined Sylvie Vartan and her rising fashion influence. “In Paris, 
what Sylvie wears the young crowd gets,” the article wrote, indicating that her clothing 
ensembles had “been seen in Rome, Zurich and Athens – and not always on teenagers.”66 The 
American fashion magazine Vogue, meanwhile, had a particular affinity for Vartan’s counterpart, 
Françoise Hardy. She was, as the magazine declared in an August 1963 issue, the “New girl in 
fashion.”67 Her soft good looks and mysterious charm, to say nothing of her burgeoning fame, 
made her an ideal model for the latest and greatest fashions. The following year, in another issue 
of Vogue, she modeled the latest inventions of one of France’s prêt-à-porter luminaries, 
Emmanuelle Khanh,68  
                                                 
 65 Green, Ready-to-Wear and Ready-to-Work, 100-102.  
 66 “Singer Sets Clothes Tempo: What Sylvie Wears, Young of Paris Get,” New York Times, March 30, 
1965. 
 67 “Fashion: New Girl in Fashion,” Vogue, August 1, 1963, 58-59.  
 68 “Françoise Hardy and Emmanuelle Khanh,” Vogue, August 1, 1964, 53.  
97 
 
The yé-yé girls helped ensure the heightened popularity of ready-made fashion in France. 
Represented abroad, the singers proved able to preserve the fabled allure of Parisian fashion, but 
they did so in a way compatible with the new realities of France's mass consumer society. In this 
way, the yé-yé phenomenon served to highlight and celebrate the transformation of everyday life 
caused by the arrival of an advanced system of consumer capitalism. Just as the meaning of 
fashion changed during this crucial period in the 1960s, the car too took on heightened 
importance to the workings and rhythms of daily life, a fact made clear in the discourses 
perpetuated by the yé-yé media. As Kristin Ross argues, "France's cultural and physic 
assimilation of the car and the new geography it had created" was, on some level, an indicator 
that French society had accepted the "state-sponsored march into modernization" and all its 
implications.69 On another level, the popularity of yé-yé reflected a similar societal coming-to-
terms with a France transformed by a culture of consumption and its constituent elements. 
 
 
                                                 
 69 Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies, 70. 
98 
 
CHAPTER 4: MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN THE YÉ-YÉ PHENOMENON, 
1962-1966 
On any other day, the sleepy commune of Loconville would have gone on unnoticed and 
undisturbed by the rest of France. Numbering fewer than two hundred people, the small village 
nestled in the Picardy region north of Paris was unaccustomed to fanfare.1 But on April 12, 1965 
all eyes were on it. On that day, Johnny Hallyday, France’s resident king of rock and roll, and his 
fiancée Sylvie Vartan, the darling of yé-yé, wed in the commune’s quaint medieval church. The 
wedding brought a fairy-tale like ending to a courtship that had started several years prior. Their 
mutual expressions of fidelity and love, affirmed by their insistence on marital union, provided a 
model for budding teenage relationships everywhere. The day marked the culmination of a 
relationship that had been followed closely by the media from the start. Les Actualités françaises 
deemed it the “event of the week.”2 Paris Match, an entertainment and news magazine, featured 
an angelic-looking Vartan on the cover cloaked in a pristine white veil.3 Various youth 
magazines promised their readers a bevy of exclusive photos and insider accounts of the big 
day.4 The event even garnered mention in international newspapers like the New York Times.5    
                                                 
1 Population numbers come from the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales’ digital history database 
of population and regional change in France since the 18th century. See “Loconville,” in “Des villages de Cassini 
aux communes d’aujourd’hui: Territoires et Population, deux siècles d’évolution,” Ecole des hautes études en 
sciences sociales, http://cassini.ehess.fr/cassini/fr/html/fiche.php?select_resultat=19790 (accessed September 26, 
2014).   
2 “Le mariage des copains: Sylvie Vartan devient Madame Smet,” April 14, 1965, Les Actualités 
Françaises, Institut National de l’Audiovisuel, Adobe Flash video file, 0:57,  
http://www.ina.fr/video/AFE86000243/le-mariage-des-copains-sylvie-vartan-devient-madame-smet-video.html 
(accessed October 24, 2014).   
3 Paris Match, April 24, 1965.   
4 Salut les copains, for instance, offered a special 176-page issue of which photos of the wedding day were 
the main focus. Its counterpart, Mademoiselle âge tendre, promised an exclusive interview about the day with Sylvie 
Vartan’s supposed best friend. See Salut les copains, May 1965; and Mademoiselle âge tendre, June 1965.  
5 “2 French ‘Pop’ Singers Wed,” New York Times, April, 13, 1965, 32.   
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As the above episode recounts, between roughly 1962 and 1966, the leading symbols of 
yé-yé readily affirmed a commitment to the gendered, heteronormative vision of sexual 
relationships borne out of the legacy of World War II and the emergent Cold War culture of 
conformity, conservatism, and containment. In spite of an emergent sexual revolution underway 
at the time, the yé-yé popular culture, with regards to questions of sexuality at least, represented a 
last gasp of a dominant postwar worldview that had already begun to erode by the mid-1960s. 
This affirmation of the prevailing social and sexual order would appear at odds with the sexual 
revolution underway at the time and of which youth and young people played so vital a part. As 
earlier chapters attested, yé-yé served as an agent of change, offering a rational vision of youth in 
a rapidly changing French Republic. At the same time, while providing a forward-looking vision 
of a decolonized and consumerist France, the yé-yé popular culture also served as a point of 
continuity and stability through its expression of dominant social and gender norms that had 
reigned supreme since the end of Second World War.          
To speak of the postwar sexual revolution is to speak of the liberalization of both state 
policies and social attitudes concerning matters ranging from reproductive rights, homosexuality, 
and sexuality outside the context of marriage. It was a phenomenon that appeared across various 
Western nations (though at different paces and degrees of success) and had real implications, 
affecting political and social rights as well as informing notions of gender and identity. In recent 
years, historians have begun to emphasize the gradual nature of the sexual revolution that took 
place in the West from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. Deeming it the “long sexual 
revolution,” they deemphasize the significance of any single event or moment in favor of a 
longer view that recognizes a slow and steady process of change. Within this context, the 
attitudes and actions of young people, buttressed by their heightened access to consumer 
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products, leisure, and education, are seen as key drivers of this “revolution.” Arthur Marwick, for 
instance, identifies the beginnings of a “long sexual revolution” already evident, if subtly, in the 
late 1950s, writing that “the new assertiveness and innovativeness of youth” towards the end of 
the decade was an integral part of a complex system of changing social and sexual values.6 The 
editors of the work Between Marx and Coca-Cola likewise see sexual liberation as a key 
component in the development of postwar “youth culture,” crediting young people for expanding 
the paradigm of acceptable social and sexual relationships in the 1960s and 1970s.7 Looking at 
France in particular, Michael Siedman identified a number of pivotal events during the late 
1950s and early 1960s, including the slackening of university cohabitation policies, which helped 
change social views and mores regarding sexuality.8 Anne-Marie Sohn, meanwhile, saw the rise 
of flirtation among 1960s teenagers, a byproduct of increased adolescent economic independence 
and leisure, as a necessary step towards the greater prominence of sexual expression and 
acceptance after 1968.9   
 The common thread in all of these works is their shared focus on the actions and attitudes 
of the era’s young people, identifying them as key drivers behind the sexual revolution. A 
                                                 
6 It is during this period, he writes, that the conventional sexual and familial relationships throughout the 
United States and Western Europe underwent striking changes. See Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural 
Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c. 1958-1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
381-382.  
7 In particular, they see the rise of cohabitating, unmarried young couples during the 1970s as an essential 
social factor in changing social attitudes regarding sexuality. See Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried, “Introduction: 
Youth, Consumption, and Politics in the Age of Radical Change,” in Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures 
in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980, ed. Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2006), 1-35.  
8 Michael Siedman, “The Pre-May 1968 Sexual Revolution,” Contemporary French Civilization 25, no. 1 
(2001): 20-41.  
9 Sohn notes that the growing role of flirtation between the sexes in the early 1960s as a contributor to the 
gradual acceptance of sexuality outside of the framework of marriage. See Anne-Marie Sohn, Age tendre et tête de 
bois: Histoire des jeunes des années 1960 (Paris: Hachette, 2001).    
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common tendency is to present the history of the sexual revolution in a linear fashion, a narrative 
of steady gains. To frame the subject in this way, though, is to obscure the numerous instances of 
resistance, both overt and subtle, to the liberalization of laws and social mores. The historian 
Dagmar Herzog reminds us that “to tell only a narrative of gradual progress would be to 
misunderstand how profoundly complicated sexual politics of the twentieth century in Europe 
actually were.”10 Using this observation as a starting point, I want to place the yé-yé phenomenon 
in its historical context, recognizing that it served to perpetuate a dominant culture of 
conservatism regarding both sexuality and gender, and that, in doing so, counteracted nascent 
expressions of sexuality found in popular literature and film from the preceding decade.    
 Several scholars have already begun to question yé-yé’s conservative outlook in relation 
to changing attitudes about sexuality. Chris Tinker, in his case study of the magazine Salut les 
copains, argues that the popular culture tacitly endorsed a model of heteronormative 
relationships and with it a clear and unambiguous division of gender roles.11 Not until the early 
1970s, he writes, did the magazine begin “to recognize alternatives to the male-female 
relationships and the middle-class marriage model.”12 Jonathyne Briggs, meanwhile, offers a 
careful analysis of how popular music performed by young women during the period generally 
served to reinforce conventional gender norms and conservative views on sexuality, even if by 
the mid-1960s these performers found subtle ways to “address sexual inequality [between men 
                                                 
10 Herzog identifies several key areas in which to complicate the notion of progress within European 
sexuality. One is the frequent instances of backlash that threatened to undermine or undo the liberalizations attained. 
A second area is to address the problems or injustices embedded in the fight for certain rights or changes. Third, 
Herzog points to the ambiguities and ambivalences inherent in sexuality. See Dagmar Herzog, Sexuality in Europe: 
A Twentieth Century History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1.     
11 Chris Tinker, Mixed Messages: Youth Magazine Discourse and Sociocultural Shifts in Salut les copains 
(1962-1976) (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010).  
12 Ibid., 135.  
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and women] and their own sexuality – albeit still often in indirect ways.”13 Along these lines, I 
aim to demonstrate how the yé-yé popular culture did little, if anything, to disrupt popular 
perceptions of marriage, family, and gender. Despite a historiography that privileges the role of 
teenage popular culture as driver in the easing of social and sexual norms, the evidence presented 
here serves to offer a more complex image.  
The Marriage Ideal 
 As late as the mid-1960s, marriage still held a near-hegemonic place with regards to 
representation in the popular media. The average age of marriage had fallen precipitously since 
the end of World War II, reaching an apex in the 1960s before gradually creeping upwards again 
from the 1970s onward.14 The phenomenon proved so conspicuous that it drew the attention of 
journalists, like Madeleine Franck who, writing for Elle in 1963, penned several articles that 
examining the trend of young marriages. Looking on skeptically, she surveyed a number of 
young adults and the challenging decisions faced when deciding to marry young.15 For its part, 
by contrast, the French state saw the marriage trends as an area of national strength. It could 
brag, as it did in a 1959 governmental publication, that one out of four Frenchmen aged 24 years 
or less were married, a number that had grown from only one out of twelve in 1900. As the 
government saw it, the prevalence of marriage meant that the postwar generation, which was 
“freer, more eager for life” than its forebears, felt confident in a newly stable and prosperous 
                                                 
13 Jonathyne Briggs, “Sex and the Girl’s Single: French Popular Music and the Long Sexual Revolution of 
the 1960s,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 21, no 3 (September 2012): 527.  
14 Claire Duchen, Women’s Rights and Women’s Lives in France, 1944-1968 (London: Routledge, 1994), 
97.   
15 See for example Madeleine Franck, “Les couples qui se marient jeunes,” Elle, March 1, 1963, 122-125, 
172-173; and Madeleine Franck, “Les mariés en blue-jeans,” Elle, March 8, 1963, 130-133, 169, 171, 175.  
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France.16 It also meant that these young people were ready to contribute to their country’s future 
from a safe and secure marital foundation. 
As the topic of young marriage gained attention elsewhere, the yé-yé popular culture 
announced its own preoccupation with marriage. Songs, advertisements, and magazine articles 
readily stressed the institution’s importance and its centrality to French society. In spite of the 
gradual societal change in attitudes regarding social and sexual relationships, the leading 
magazines and performers of yé-yé tenaciously clung to the marriage ideal as the principal, if not 
the only, form of social organization between the sexes. In particular, teenage girls proved the 
primary recipients of this emphasis on the marriage ideal. Advertisements targeted them; one, for 
a Parisian wedding dress boutique, encouraged female readers to “realize the marriage of [their] 
dreams.”17 Elsewhere, advice columns, purporting to educate, encouraged readers to think about 
nuptials. The March 1965 issue of Mademoiselle âge tendre, for instance, prompted its teenage 
audience to ask parents about marriage; “what conditions do I have to fulfill to be able to marry” 
was the suggested wording.18 Similarly, journalists eagerly discussed the topic with the stars of 
yé-yé. In particular, interviewers often questioned female performers about their thoughts on the 
matter. Speaking with Michéle Torr in a 1965 issue of Salut les copains, for instance, an 
interviewer asked if the singer ever thought about marriage. In her response, Torr tried to 
navigate her own preferences, the realities of her profession, and societal expectations by 
responding that “yes,” she thought about it, but that she wanted to delay it until “the latest 
                                                 
16 Centre de Diffusion Française, The Young Face of France (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1959), 
61.  
17 Mademoiselle, no. 4, 1964.  
18 “20 Questions à poser à vos parents,” Mademoiselle âge tendre, March 1965, 76.  
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possible” age – “upwards of thirty years old, maybe” – given that being a famed singer made 
having a successful relationship difficult.19 As Torr’s testimony attested, the societal expectation 
of marriage meant that, even in exceptional circumstances, it was not a question of if, but when.  
 Even popular songs confirmed the prevailing logic of marriage. In 1964, at the height of 
her popularity, Sheila released Sheila 6e disque, an extended-play record containing the song “Un 
jour, je me marierai” (“One day, I will marry”). As the lyrics went: 
Like all the girls 
I hope that one day I will encounter it 
Oh yeah! 
Like all the girls 
I too dream that one day I will marry 
Oh yeah! 
 
Because soon he will come 
The one who will say to me “for life, the two of us are united” 
They often say “don’t be in too much of a hurry,  
because to marry you have all the time” 
Me, I agree but I believe that now 
I can think about it from time to time 
 
Because me, yes 
I already see happy ones all around me 
All my copains, all those that I really love 
Two small boys will come to the church 
To hold the long gown that I will wear20  
 
Interestingly enough, the song was an adaptation of the US singer Brenda Lee’s 1964 single 
“The Waiting Game.”21 But whereas Lee’s version sung vaguely about the teenage wait for true 
love, Sheila’s variant featured rewritten lyrics focusing specifically on the act of marriage. Just 
                                                 
19 30 questions à Michéle Torr,” Salut les copains, March 1965, 121.  
20 Sheila, “Un Jour, Je Me Marierai,” Sheila 6e Disque, Philips 434 913 BE, 1964, EP.   
21 Brenda Lee, “The Waiting Game,” The Waiting Game, Decca 31599, 1964, Single.   
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as significant was the fact that the song came not from some obscure performer along the fringes 
of yé-yé, but from one of the genre’s most prominent stars.   
 Though seemingly at odds with a society of increasing permissiveness and tolerance to 
other forms of sexual relationship, the privileged status of marriage found in the yé-yé media and 
among its performers mirrored international trends borne out of the postwar era. In the two 
decades following World War II, people married in greater numbers and at younger ages than at 
any time in recent memory. Not limited to France, similar phenomena were noted in the United 
States, Britain, and Canada. But it was not just marriage that thrived, it was a particular kind of 
marriage. Stephanie Coontz reminds us that, in all these countries, there was a striking “cultural 
consensus” concerning the universality of marriage and the primacy of the “traditional,” male 
breadwinner-led family unit.22 During the period, alternatives to this model were seldom 
considered. The irony, of course, was that though it was labeled a traditional and age-old model, 
this particular conception of marriage was quite unique to its time. In Western Europe, the 
unwavering faith in this narrow view of marriage and family represented a search for stability in 
the wake of the greatest bout of genocide and destruction the continent had even seen.23 The 
onset of the Cold War and the general state of anxiety it produced also contributed to the 
marriage ideal. In the US at least, as Elaine Tyler May argues, the self-contained nuclear family 
                                                 
22 Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History: From Obedience to Intimacy or How Love Conquered Marriage 
(New York: Viking, 2005), 229.  
23 On marriage and the search for “normality” in Europe following World War II, see Dagmar Herzog, 
“Desperately Seeking Normality: Sex and Marriage in the Wake of War” and Pat Thane, “Family Life and 
‘Normality’ in Postwar British Culture” in Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, eds., Life After Death: Approaches 
to a Cultural and Social History during the 1940s and 1950s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 161-
210.     
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buttressed by marriage and domesticity offered safe harbor in an otherwise uncertain world.24 In 
France, marriage provided a similar refuge to the anxieties of modern life.          
Envisioning the Ideal Mother and Housewife 
 This societal search for stability in the two decades following World War II, expressed 
through a heightened recourse to marriage, lent itself to idealized notions of domesticity, ones 
that had implications concerning women’s roles both inside and outside the home. In this 
context, marriage was practically inseparable from the larger notion of family; the former was 
tacitly understood as the necessary requisite for the latter. Taken together, the concepts of 
marriage and family evoked starkly defined and hardened gender roles, neatly delineated 
between husband and wife. An entire regulatory discourse operated across mediums to ensure the 
maintenance of these two opposing roles. For women, questions about family pointed directly to 
their roles as mothers. The renewed societal appetite for domestic comfort, buoyed by France’s 
expanding consumer economy, meanwhile heightened links between women as housewives and 
homemakers. These two socially-defined roles, mother and housewife, were not mutually 
exclusive and instead often served to reinforce one another. As such, the complimentary tandem 
provided two dominant feminine ideals during the period. What made these idealized feminine 
representations so powerful was their apparent naturalness. For its part, the yé-yé popular culture 
contributed to this perception; journalists framed the gendered notion of marriage with an easy, 
self-satisfying logic while the popular young stars did their best to play the part of the ideal 
spouse.   
                                                 
24 On this argument, see Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era 
(New York: Basic Books, 1988).   
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The convergence of mother and housewife was on full display in a 1965 article of 
Mademoiselle âge tendre, which posed a question to its female readership: “Marriage, is it right 
for you?”25 By answering the twenty questions that followed, the reader would apparently be 
able to conclude whether marriage suited them or not. Many of the questions subtly suggested a 
particular vision of marriage: “Are you touched by a crying baby?” “Do you like to do the 
shopping for your mother?” “When your mother is ill, can you fill in for her around the house?” 
“When your mother has friends come over, do you enjoy making the dinner courses?”26 
Questions of this tone and nature left readers with little variety in what constituted the woman’s 
contribution to marriage. While positioning itself as an objective survey between two legitimate 
alternatives, its conclusion clearly revealed preference for one over the other. When readers 
flipped to the back page to discover if, based on their responses, marriage suited them, they were 
given their answer. If they answered “yes” to a majority of the questions, they were indeed fit for 
marriage. “You know to do what is necessary when it is necessary; you are understanding, 
helpful, maternal.” For those who answer in the negative, ill-suited for marriage, they were 
evidently dynamic and independent. “But,” it continued, “have those close to you ever made it 
clear to you that you have been a bit self-centered?”27 Framed in this way, the questionnaire 
offered the appearance of neutrality while subtly exerting a form of prescriptive social policing 
that left little room for deviation.   
 While the questionnaire spoke to women’s roles as both mothers and housewives, it is 
nevertheless telling that the very first question, out of twenty, alluded to motherhood. It reflected 
                                                 
25 “Le mariage est-il fait pour vous?,” Mademoiselle âge tendre, May 1965, 82-83, 108.  
26 Ibid., 82.  
27 Ibid., 108.  
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a prevailing thought that tied women’s civic and political roles within society to their biological 
capacity to reproduce. Since the nineteenth century, a number of political, religious, and medical 
discourses intersected to avow women’s foremost place as mothers, portraying them as a 
moralizing force within society, responsible for imparting upon future generations prescribed 
social, civic, and religious values.28 Alongside popular thought, an entire legal and political 
framework, starting with the Napoleonic Civil Code in 1804, emerged to limit women’s 
participation in public life, therefore lending credence to the belief that women’s “natural” role 
was as mothers within the domestic sphere.29 As such, long before women gained the right to 
vote, their contribution to the nation came through the creation of new (hopefully more 
populous) generations.  
The strong linkage between women and motherhood stemmed partly from national fears 
about tepid population growth and low fertility rates. Once the most populous nation in Europe, 
France’s natality slowed in the second half of the nineteenth century; by the early twentieth 
century its population count had been surpassed by hostile neighboring countries. The 
                                                 
28 Both bourgeois social thinkers and republican political commentators (who were often of the same ilk) 
saw mothers as the first and most influential educators, imparting their children with proper moral and social values 
as well as requisite republican ideals. The Catholic Church similarly viewed mothers as essential agents in 
transmitting religious belief to their children. Nineteenth-century medical practitioners meanwhile, seeking to 
understand the sexual difference between men and women, defined “woman” medically in relation to her capacity to 
reproduce. See James F. McMillan, France and Women 1789-1914: Gender, Society and Politics (London: 
Routledge, 2000).   
29 The Napoleonic Civil Code codified female subordination. Article 213 of the code, for instance, decreed 
that women had to obey their husbands. Article 1124, stated that, in the eyes of the law, women were deemed 
minors, falling under the legal guardianship of men, beginning with their fathers and followed by their eventual 
husbands. It formed the basis for subsequent laws that continued to define women’s rights in relation to their 
husbands. Over time, the laws were modified and women acquired more rights, though in a piecemeal fashion. Still, 
well into the postwar period, a husband continued to have control over his wife’s assets and property, he had the 
ability to contest her right to employment if he deemed it against the best interests of the family, and he possessed 
legal control over the family’s children. Richard Ivan Jobs, Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of 
France after the Second World War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 191; Laura Levine Frader, 
Breadwinners and Citizens: Gender and the Making of the French Social Model (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2008), 234-235.   
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conventional wisdom of the period suggested that national strength, both economic and military, 
was tied directly to population numbers. As such, a lengthy process of depopulation proved 
cause for national anxiety.30 The bloodletting of the First World War brought existing fears about 
French depopulation to a fever pitch. In the war’s aftermath, the conservative French National 
Assembly deemed it prudent to intervene into the sexual lives of French citizens, culminating in 
a number of pro-natal strategies, including stringent law in defense of procreation.31 It also 
turned to a number of policies meant to encourage higher birthrates, including the creation of 
robust social benefits as well as symbolic gestures that celebrated motherhood.32 Despite failing 
to meet its intended goal of increasing national fertility, portions of the laws prohibiting 
contraceptives were later codified into the Public Health Code under the postwar Fourth 
Republic, reaffirming the state’s commitment to increasing France’s birth rates.33 Despite 
mounting pressure for revision from the 1950s onward, the law remained in effect well into the 
1960s; contraceptives were only partially legalized with the passage of the Neuwirth law in 
December 1967.34  
                                                 
30 Mary-Louise Roberts, Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917-1927 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 99. 
31 The law, passed on 31 July 1920, outlawed abortion and made all sale, distribution, and advertisement of 
contraceptives illegal. Any materials, ranging from pamphlets and books to fliers, that promoted or offered 
instruction for the prevention of pregnancy fell under purview of the law. See Janine Mossuz-Lavau, Les lois de 
l'amour: Les politiques de la sexualité en France (1950-2002) (Paris: Payot & Rivages, 2002), 16. For a thorough 
examination of the law as an expression of cultural anxieties, see the chapter “A Matter of Life or Death” in Roberts, 
Civilization without Sexes, 93-119.  
32  For instance, the Medal of the French Family, created in 1920, awarded mothers throughout France 
medals; bronze, silver, or gold depending on the number of children produced. In a similar spirit, the government 
established Mother’s Day in 1926 as a means to celebrate mothers’ contributions to the nation. Frader, 
Breadwinners and Citizens, 21-22.  
33  As opponents of the law made clear in the late 1950s, annual birthrates in France continued to decline, 
from approximately 800,000 annually in 1920 at the time of the law’s passage to approximately 600,000 some 20 
years later. See Mossuz-Lavau, Les lois de l'amour, 18-30.   
34 Already in the 1950s a growing number of advocacy groups, medical practitioners, and politicians began 
mounting challenges to the law. It was in 1965, however, that the question came into national focus, when, during 
the presidential election, the leftist candidate François Mitterrand made the legalization of contraceptives a part of 
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The attitudes on display in the yé-yé discourse, however far removed from the century-
long politics of motherhood, were nevertheless products of this historical legacy. To be sure, the 
yé-yé media generally avoided discussion of questions of a sexual and political nature. This is not 
completely surprising, given that the yé-yé popular culture’s (ostensible) purpose was to 
entertain, to say nothing of the fact that its primary audience consisted of adolescents ineligible 
to vote on such matters. Still, it was precisely because yé-yé appeared apolitical that the cultural 
assumptions it advanced carried weight – they were treated not as contested political views but 
as simple reflections of nature.   
Many of the most famous stars of yé-yé confirmed these feminine ideals, either directly in 
interviews or indirectly through their depiction in entertainment stories. The singer France Gall, 
in the introductory issue of the youth magazine Formidable, confessed that “like all the girls” her 
age, she waited for “prince charming.” “I would like to have two or three children,” she added, 
noting that “as soon as their birth, I will abandon [my professional career] forever.”35 More 
vaguely, Sylvie Vartan, noted once that, if she was unable to reconcile her professional and 
personal lives and had to choose one, she would “opt for the private life, for marriage.”36 It was 
precisely this attitude that garnered favor elsewhere in the media. In an article appearing in a 
1963 issue of Age tendre et tête de bois, two music critics sparred over which singer was better, 
Françoise Hardy or Vartan. The singers were the two most celebrated chanteuses in all of yé-yé 
and, as such, the critics debated their merits. Though seemingly unrelated to her capacity to 
                                                 
his platform, a stark contrast to President Charles de Gaulle's paternalistic approach. The passage of the Neuwirth 
law on December 28, 1967 made contraceptives legal, but advertisements were still heavily regulated and youths 
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35 Claude Stevens, “Allez France,” Formidable, January 1965, 52.  
36 Raymond Mouly, "Songeuse Sylvie, Souriante et Sage," Salut les copains, March 1963, 78.  
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perform music, the critic arguing in Vartan’s favor, Michèle Ribaud, averred that, unlike the 
independent Hardy, it was one of Sylvie’s charms that she could “admit that she is capable of 
abandoning her career to establish a home and have children."37 On numerous occasions, the yé-
yé media offered a romantic view of the family ideal. But it was not only the youth press that 
linked the stars of yé-yé to the prevailing conception of family in postwar France.  
Adult-oriented magazines likewise seized opportunities to cast yé-yé singers in a 
domestic context. The popular women’s magazine Elle ran a story in its July 1963 issue 
spotlighting Michèle Anthony, the wife of the yé-yé singer Richard Anthony.38 The article no 
doubt sought to satisfy the public’s appetite for information about the private lives of the famous. 
But instead of painting the picture of an exceptional lifestyle, the article stressed Madame 
Anthony’s normalness in spite of her husband’s unique career. Immediately, the journalist 
characterizes Madame Anthony as a demure housewife, eager to stay out of the spotlight and 
reluctant to be the article’s main focus. The journalist describes the Anthonys’ house, a domicile 
far removed from her expectations, and the sight of Madame Anthony’s arrival at the foot of the 
staircase. She was, as the journalist described her, the “perfect lady of the house.” As the 
conscientious host, Madame Anthony promptly laid out a pristine table setting and served her 
guest a warm beverage. Enjoying the arrangement, the author of the article deemed it “the 
bourgeoisie at tea-time.”39 In short, she was the ideal housewife. Equally suggestive was the 
inclusion of several photographs demonstrating Madame Anthony’s motherly bona fides. In one 
                                                 
37 Louys Gros and Michèle Ribaud, “Françoise et Sylvie: c’est la guerre de sourires,” Age tendre et tête de 
bois, April 1963, 31.  
38  Marlyse Shaeffer, “Comment vit la femme d’une idole: Mme Richard Anthony,” Elle, July 26, 1963, 32-
35. 
39 Ibid., 32.   
112 
 
photo, she laid in the grass, accompanied by her husband, their two young children, and the 
family dog. In it the two parents looked towards their children lovingly, a harmonious nuclear 
family. In another, Madame Anthony was depicted delicately feeding her children.40 Capturing 
her at the most banal moments of the day, the article demystified the life of the celebrity wife 
while simultaneously affirming the universality of the housewife-mother ideal.   
In a 1965 issue, the magazine Mademoiselle âge tendre provided a roundtable-type 
discussion that prompted six famous young women to offer their thoughts on marriage. Among 
them, four were musical performers (Sylvie Vartan, Françoise Hardy, Gillian Hills, and 
Marianne Faithfull), one an Olympic swimmer (Christine Caron), and the other a champion 
Alpine skier (Annie Famose).41 Among other questions, the magazine asked the contributors 
whether marriage was a necessity and what constituted the ideal husband and the ideal wife. All 
of the participants, save for Françoise Hardy, deemed marriage a necessity.42 The occasion 
provided the opportunity to affirm existing perceptions of the feminine ideal. Several 
respondents conjured the image of the modest housewife and doting mother as the model spouse. 
Caron, the Olympic swimmer, responded that “the ideal spouse is …. a girl capable of sewing, 
ironing, and cooking,” all while maintaining a smiling visage and a gay and coquettish 
demeanor. Understanding the unlikely reality of this ideal, Caron jokingly continued, “alas, I am 
not yet fit to marry.”43 In the same discussion, Vartan defined the ideal wife more plainly. She 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 33, 35.  
41  "Le mariage: pourquoi? Quand? Comment? Six filles connues répondent …,” Mademoiselle âge tendre, 
May 1965, 62-65.  
42 Raised by an unmarried, single mother in a bourgeois quartier of Paris, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Hardy felt little inclination to perpetuate the ideals of marriage and family that likely had little resonance with her. A 
recent biography, though unintended for a scholarly audience, sheds light on Hardy’s upbringing. See Pierre 
Mikaïloff, Françoise Hardy: Tant de belles choses (Monaco: Alphée Jean-Paul Bertrand, 2009).  
43 "Le mariage: pourquoi? Quand? Comment? Six filles connues répondent …,” 64.  
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concluded that “a girl who is going to marry must think foremost to two things: does she know 
how to keep [up] a house? Will she know how to take care of infants who might come?”44   
As the above evidence suggests, the roles of mother and housewife often went hand in 
hand. Still, there were numerous occasions when the topic of children remained absent from 
discussion. Even without mention of children, though, the feminine ideal espoused in the yé-yé 
media still remained firmly rooted in the domestic sphere. The female stars of yé-yé were often 
expected to display the requisite qualities of being a housewife. Early in an interview with Sylvie 
Vartan, for instance, a journalist asked: “I would like to know if you have any household talents, 
if for example one could count on you to make an omelet.”  The journalist, Raymond Mouly, 
continued, noting that he finds that “almost all of the female singers (chanteuses) have a little 
specialty that brings joy to their copains and to journalists.”45 Somewhat defensively, Vartan 
replied that she helped her mother “sweep up and run the vacuum cleaner, that’s all.” Vartan, 
whose family emigrated from Bulgaria when she was eight years old, felt the need to explain her 
lack of further domestic knowhow. The rigors of learning the language consumed her energies: 
“At the age where I would have been able to learn cooking and sewing, like a lot of young girls 
do, I was a student completely absorbed by my studies,” she responded, reminding the 
interviewer of her Bulgarian origins.46 Michèle Torr, interviewed in Salut les copains, was asked 
similar questions. The interviewer inquired whether the young singer knew how to sew and 
whether she could cook. Torr confessed that, while she had general knowledge in both, she was 
not particularly adept at either. It was in this same interview, already discussed earlier in the 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 65.  
45 Mouly, "Songeuse Sylvie, Souriante et Sage," 36.  
46 Ibid., 36.  
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chapter, where Torr acknowledged her desire to delay marriage. In the following month’s issue, 
a male reader wrote to the editor with a bit of sardonic advice. “Michèle Torr has good reason to 
want to marry as late as possible,” he wrote. “She isn’t sure how to sew a dress, she doesn’t like 
to cook, and cites sleeping as her favorite distraction. Therefore guys, you’ve understood, if you 
nab Michèle, first get yourself a housemaid.”47     
While female domesticity had its roots in a nineteenth century bourgeois conception of 
privacy, the housewife envisioned in the descriptions above was a product of France’s postwar 
experience. The Second World War threw the conception of “home” into turmoil, exacerbating 
existing shortcomings in housing that had plagued France since the nineteenth century.48 The 
historian W. Brian Newsome estimates that France lost over two million structures as a result of 
the war.49 The conflict left millions of families without adequate living accommodations. As 
national recovery commenced, housing became not only a site of reconstruction, but also of 
France’s modernization efforts. Though rebuilding efforts launched at a slower rate than 
anticipated, by the mid-1950s the pace had great increased, reaching some 270,000 new housing 
                                                 
47 Gilles Gravier, “Si vous en pincez pour Michèle,” Salut les copains, April 1965, 12.  
48 Even before the destruction brought by the war, there were questions about the state of French housing. 
An assessment undertaken by the wartime Vichy government in 1941-1942 underscored the dire situation. The 
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Zdatny, “The French Hygiene Offensive of the 1950s: A Critical Moment in the History of Manners,” The Journal 
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Politics and Society 1898-1991 (London: Hodder Education, 1992), 56.      
49 W. Brian Newsome. French Urban Planning 1940-1968: The Construction and Deconstruction of an 
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units per annum by 1957.50 With the building of new housing came an increased appetite for 
domestic comforts from a population that had weathered a lengthy period of economic and 
material hardship. First came increased access to basic comforts, like clean running water, as 
well as indoor toilets, showers, and bathtubs.51 Second, the expansion of France’s economy 
availed the purchase of consumer durables that similarly spelled comfort within the home.  
Appliances like the refrigerator and the washing machine became symbols of a 
modernized household, distancing French citizens from the memory of war and penury. The new 
home, replete with sophisticated consumer products, was symptomatic of France’s larger 
modernization efforts, and whereas a new educated class of salaried, technocratic employees 
emerged to manage an increasingly technological and corporate postwar economy, women 
increasingly became seen as managers of the new household.52 Adam C. Stanley argues that an 
                                                 
50 For comparison, only 74,920 housing units were built in the year 1952. Maurice Larkin, France since the 
Popular Front: Government and People, 1936-1996, 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 188.  
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Hygiene Offensive of the 1950s,” 914-916; Larkin, France since the Popular Front, 211.   
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this rebuilding efforts through their role as consumers. As “citizen consumers,” they consumed for the good of their 
family while simultaneously helping to stimulate the economy. At the same time, though, dominant discourses 
defined women’s contributions to the nation through their consumption and their “management” of the home and, in 
the process, secured their place in the domestic sphere in spite of newfound political rights. See Pulju, Women and 
Mass Consumer Society in Postwar France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).     
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ideology linking women to the “modern,” appliance-equipped home began in the interwar years 
at a time when actual ownership of domestic appliances was scant.53 In the postwar period, 
discourse, imbued with an ideology of productivity and efficiency, linked women to the 
household further. Popular women’s magazines like Elle and Marie-Claire endeavored to 
educate their female readership, teaching them how to manage their homes in an efficient and 
orderly manner. Sharing the same mindset, domestic science courses prepared school-age girls to 
assume their eventual roles as productive, knowledgeable housewives.54  The contradiction, of 
course, was that for many working-class and lower middle-class families, two incomes were 
required in order to afford the modern appliances.55 As such, with the rise of an expanding 
consumer economy in the 1950s and 1960s, the number of two-income families in France duly 
rose. Still, despite an increasing need for women in the workplace, both state taxation policies 
and public opinion served to dissuade the participation of married women in the workforce well 
into the 1960s.56 As late as 1963, 82% of the population thought that a married woman’s place 
was in the home.57 
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56 If a married couple both earned wages, they were taxed at a higher rate than if the husband was the sole 
wage-earner and also at a higher rate than if the two had declared their taxes separately. This situation served to 
discourage married women from entering the workforce. Ibid., 87.     
57 A Gallup Poll, working with the Institut Français d’Opinion Publique (IFOP) asked whether a married 
woman “should have a job” or “spend all of her time working at home.” Eighty-two percent felt she should “work at 
home” while only 17% thought she “should have a job” (1% did not know their feelings on the matter). See George 
H. Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: France 1939, 1944-1975, vol. 1 (New York: Random 
House, 1976), 363.   
117 
 
Containing Youth Sexuality 
As a dominant signifier of femininity, though, the mother-housewife had its rivals. In 
particular, the image of the young, independent girl provided a contrasting symbol to the tenets 
of motherhood and marriage. As depicted in popular media, the young girl often evoked, for 
good or for bad, visions of modernity. A potent early incarnation of the modern girl was the 
garçonne, a figure that entered the French cultural imagination in the 1920s. Featuring a short 
skirt, a bobbed haircut, and a casual attitude towards sexuality, the garçonne seemed to flout 
conservative societal norms. For observers, the garçonne, whether real or imagined, seemed to 
represent the myriad disruptions to the bourgeois social order in the aftermath of World War I.58 
In the 1950s a new image of youthful femininity appeared, conjured into being by popular works 
in film, literature, and advertisements. With these various works, a whole constellation of 
cultural signifiers emerged to lend coherence to a specific view of youthful femininity that, while 
different from the 1920s variant, nevertheless shared the apparent sexual promiscuity and 
subversive independence of its forebear. A representative example of this ascendant view of 
adolescent femininity was on full display in the 1954 novel Bonjour tristesse (Hello, sadness). 
Written by Françoise Sagan, who was herself not yet twenty years old, the novel centered around 
the teenage lead Cécile, a character defined by her sharp cynicism, manipulative behavior, and 
unburdened sexual urges. The book was an immediate, if controversial, success, selling over one 
million copies in France alone and winning a prestigious literary award in the year of its release. 
Its popularity nevertheless offered for some observers an uncomfortable image of teenage 
independence exercising resistance to a patriarchal bourgeois order through sexual means and a 
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disregard for parental authority. The fact that the story came from the mind of a young girl made 
the anxiety all the more acute.59  
While Bonjour tristesse became an obvious point of reference for the new, sexually-
charged and independent femininity, no single person or cultural product came to define this 
postwar image more than the actress and fashion model Brigitte Bardot. Between 1952 and 1965, 
she cemented her reputation as one of the most recognizable international celebrities, appearing 
in nearly forty films and gracing the pages of innumerable magazines and tabloids during that 
span. Thanks to an insatiable interest from paparazzi, Bardot received more coverage in the press 
than even the French president, Charles de Gaulle.60 Throughout, she exuded a cool and 
confident demeanor, outfitted in occasionally skimpy but always stylish ready-to-wear clothing 
alongside an effortlessly unkempt coiffure. It was a look eagerly emulated by millions of girls. In 
the process, she staked her claim as the first bona fide postwar sex symbol thanks to her sultry 
appearances in numerous films, like Roger Vadim’s 1956 Et Dieu … créa la femme (And God 
created Woman), where she comfortably flaunted her nude body onscreen for viewers’ titillation. 
Her off-screen persona followed similar lines, with the media routinely sexualizing her image. 
What made Bardot so seemingly scandalous, though, was not only her comfortable expressions 
of sexual desire, it was also her unencumbered sexual aggressiveness. Her willing pursuit of 
male counterparts in search of her own sexual gratification, whether on-screen or off, appeared to 
subvert the gendered order of society, in which women were expected to be demure and 
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unassertive, waiting patiently for male attention.61 It was ultimately Bardot’s rejection of societal 
expectations regarding femininity that made her so simultaneously alluring and scandalous.62   
With the rise of the yé-yé in the 1960s, the dominant image of youthful femininity 
underwent a subtle change. The casual sexuality displayed by Bardot and others was rebuked in 
favor of a more contained, conservative outlook. Emblematic of this shifting attitude was an 
article in the first issue of Age tendre et tête de bois. In an article, the journalist Naej Yruam 
excoriated Bardot, as the reigning sex symbol of the era, for crafting an unsuitable image for 
young people.63 To begin the article, the journalist looked back nostalgically to Bardot's early 
career, when she was the so-called “Marianne of our youth” and the “petite princess of the 20th 
century.” A number of controversies swiftly sullied this wholesome image. “But suddenly, alas,” 
Yruam continued, “marriage, divorces, suicide [attempts], and above all films restricted to teens 
younger than 18.”64 To make the case that this view was not held by the author alone, the article 
included a number of brief responses from teenagers. Some understood the celebrity’s decisions. 
Others, however, echoed the author's argument. One, an eighteen year old factory worker 
remarked that Bardot had “betrayed” young people with her regrettable actions. Another, a 
teenage girl, opined that young people needed a soft, agreeable, and intelligent girl to serve as a 
role model to young people. At one time Bardot met that criteria, the girl continued, but "it's true 
that she disappointed me."65    
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With the rejection of the sexualized image of Bardot, the yé-yé phenomenon began 
crafting its own image of youthful femininity in the form of the copine. The copine – the 
idealized female adherent of yé-yé – retained some hallmarks from its 1950s predecessors, 
adopting the carefree and independent spirit as well as the gratification through personal 
pleasure. But whereas the pursuit of pleasure was expressed in sexual terms by earlier icons like 
Bardot, the copines channeled it in different ways, redirecting it from sexuality and towards 
consumption and leisure. In the process, the concept of youthful femininity became contained; 
no longer did it stand in stark contrast to the domesticity of the mouther-housewife ideal. Instead, 
it became a prelude to it, a brief window of time where an adolescent girl can enjoy her 
frivolities before assuming her ordained role within the home.66   
The teen magazine Formidable reflected as much in a lengthy examination of “the girls 
[of] ‘66.”67 Immediately, the article reveled in the fact that the “typical” girl in 1966 would 
pursue her driver’s examinations with an eye towards eventual automobile ownership. The girl of 
1966 wore the latest fashions, had money to spend, and was highly sociable. She could go out 
several evenings per week and she could remark freely about the trivialities of teenage romance. 
Taken together, the article suggested that the modern girl was an independent, fun-loving, and 
carefree consumer. Before concluding, though, the article felt it necessary to remind its readers 
that, though these teens knew how to have fun, they still “contemplate marriage with much 
                                                 
66 This is an argument made by Susan Wiener. Though not addressing the copine specifically, she finds that 
popular representations of teenage girls in the 1960s framed the apparent independence brought by consumption and 
leisure as a precursor to an eventual lifetime of marriage and motherhood. See Susan Weiner, “Two Modernities: 
From ‘Elle’ to ‘Mademoiselle’. Women’s magazines in Postwar France,” Contemporary European History 8, no. 3 
(Nov., 1999): 395-409.      
67 Annie Boutaud, “Les filles 66 sont comme ça,” Formidable, November 1965, 21-27.  
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seriousness.”68 Intending to marry between 20 and 22 years old, these girls would soon be the 
“perfect spouses.” The following quotation from a young respondent made it clear what this 
meant: for her future husband, the girl quoted promised that she “will make all his favorite 
meals.”69 As such, the girls, while enjoying the pleasures of youth, still looked forward to a 
lifetime as loyal spouses.  
Well into the 1960s, the yé-yé popular culture offered a singular vision of marriage and 
family. Popular female singers and journalists affirmed the importance of marriage and roles of 
mothers and housewives within it. Throughout, magazines, songs, and other sources collectively 
operated to define adolescence in relation to the feminine domestic ideal. While they could have 
fun, they were expected to nevertheless envision the future, aligning their expectations with 
those of a society that still deemed women’s foremost role within the household. Even with the 
emergence of expressions of sexuality outside of marriage, on display in works like Bonjour 
tristesse and the films of Brigitte Bardot, the major influences of yé-yé continued to echo 
dominant notions of gender and sexuality emblematic of the early postwar period. When, in the 
late 1960s, young people began to challenge the conservative outlook on sexuality and gender, 
they likewise rejected the assumptions upheld by the stars and media of yé-yé. As the epilogue 
suggests, the popular resonance of yé-yé amongst young people, so prevalent in the middle of the 
1960s, correspondingly declined in accordance with changing tastes and attitudes. 
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EPILOQUE: THE DECLINE OF YÉ-YÉ, 1966-1968 
In May 1968, the whole of France was brought to a screeching halt. What started out as a 
campus protest at a university on the outskirts of Paris had escalated by month’s end to a 
nationwide general strike that joined students and workers, both disillusioned by France’s 
modernization efforts, in a common cause to refashion French society. Workers occupied 
factories while the university students seized control of campuses. Leftist organizations staged 
massive marches, and students clashed with police, forming cobblestone barricades and 
placarding Paris with inventive graffiti and posters. For the discontented students, the events of 
May proved a cathartic revolt against a system that had reserved a vital role for them but allowed 
them no voice. Their ambitious agenda included education reform, heightened sexual freedoms, 
and more political participation, as well as a general rejection of what they saw as an 
increasingly technocratic and bureaucratic society of consumption under the heavy hand of 
Gaullism. While the music and of yé-yé was not caught directly in the fray, it was nevertheless 
an integral part of the system that felt so stifling for so many young people. The protestors’ 
impassioned lament of “consumer society” certainly included a yé-yé popular culture which had 
gone to such lengths to celebrate France’s consumerist aspirations.1    
The protests of May 1968 were not the first signs of a fading yé-yé popular culture, but 
rather the final pronounced denouement of a gradual decline that began several years earlier. The 
rise of the folk singer Antoine, who burst onto the French music scene in 1966, and his 
subsequent rift with Johnny Hallyday, yé-yé’s reigning king, was a pronounced example of the 
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changing direction of French popular music. From the start, he cultivated an image built in 
opposition to the wholesome copains of yé-yé. Whereas, by 1965, Johnny Hallyday (the 
preeminent yé-yé teen idol) had adopted a respectably clean-cut middle class persona, Antoine 
offered a rebellious bohemian image more befitting Haight-Ashbury than the Left Bank of Paris.2 
Antoine’s self-titled debut album, released in early 1966, featured the singer crouched with 
acoustic guitar in hand, his shoulder-length hair falling on a flowery shirt. His biggest hit from 
the album, “Les Elucubrations D’Antoine” (“The Rantings of Antoine”), stirred controversy with 
its flippant lyrics laced with sarcasm.3 Aside from mentioning the singer’s preference for long 
hair and flower-print shirts, it also touched on social issues: its final verse recounted a fictional 
conversation with President de Gaulle who asked the singer what he would do to improve the 
country. His response: “Put the [birth control] pill on sale in the [retail store] Monoprix.”4 The 
lyrics celebrated newness and change. As one verse read: “Everything should change all the 
time/ The world would be much more amusing/ We would see planes in the metro corridors/ And 
Johnny Hallyday in a cage at [the] Médrano [Circus].”5 Mocking the most popular yé-yé singer 
underscored Antoine’s bid to differentiate himself. Hallyday responded to the public slight with a 
song of his own, titled “Cheveux Longs et Idées Courtes” (“Long Hair and Short on Ideas”), 
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which mocked the self-righteousness and self-aggrandizement of Antoine and others.6 His image 
changed too, as by late 1966 he had long sideburns and shaggy hair, but it was too little too late.7    
A New York Times article, highlighting the feud between Antoine and Hallyday, 
recognized the changing shift in popular tastes. Hallyday, the article found, was “a young man 
with long hair which may not be quite long enough.”8 “His elders viewed him as a smoldering 
rebel” the article continued, “but can it be that, at the ripe age of 23, he has become bourgeois?” 
The two singers personified the larger gulf between the apolitical conservatism of yé-yé and the 
newer musical trends shaped by a yearning for political expression. “The Antoine enthusiasts 
have made it very clear that they consider Hallyday passé, bourgeois, someone who has nothing 
to say. On the other hand, Hallyday and his fans believe that Antoine represents a trend toward a 
new femininity in men.”9 The difference, the article noted, came down to the fact that Hallyday 
played uncomplicated rock and roll while Antoine “clicks with songs about current events,” 
which included birth control, the Vietnam War, and racism. It was clear that Antoine, with his 
“rambling songs of protest,” had become the new trendsetter.10  
The sensations caused by Antoine were symptomatic of a larger transformation. For one, 
the popular music press changed, becoming more fragmented. For the first half of the decade, the 
majority of the magazines collectively affirmed, in one way or another, the copain culture. Over 
the second half of the decade, a number of new music magazines emerged. Unlike the magazines 
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of yé-yé, which contented themselves following teen idols and celebrating adolescent fun, these 
new periodicals struck a more intellectual and analytical tone. First came Rock & Folk in 1966, 
then Beat in 1968, and finally Actuel in 1970.11 By the late 1960s, there remained only vestiges 
of the once prominent musical phenomenon. Many of the teen music magazines dated from the 
yé-yé years between 1962 and 1966 folded; only Salut les copains and its sister publication 
Mademoiselle âge tendre, not coincidently both under the capable direction of Daniel Filipacchi, 
continued into the 1970s. At the same time, many of the teen idols who found fame during the 
yé-yé phenomenon’s height struggled to adapt. Of the popular singers, only the biggest stars to 
emerge from the genre, like Françoise Hardy and Sylvie Vartan, proved able to sustain success 
late into their careers. They did so, however, by transcending the yé-yé image and sound. Others, 
like Claude François and Sheila, reinvented themselves by riding the next wave in French 
popular music, disco.   
Though the decline was gradual, by 1968 the yé-yé popular culture proved out of step 
with the young people it had long claimed to reflect. This was made abundantly clear amid the 
protests of May. The collective silence from the phenomenon’s major voices – teen idols and 
magazines – on the topic spoke volumes. A June 1968 issue of the magazine Noir et blanc 
interviewed a number of teen idols to determine “what they think of the young people’s 
‘revolution.’”12 Most, like Johnny Hallyday and Sheila, proved evasive, refusing to offer a clear 
opinion. Françoise Hardy, perceived to be the most cerebral of the yé-yé teen idols, responded 
                                                 
11 David Looseley, "In from the margins: chanson, pop and cultural legitimacy," in Hugh Dauncey and 
Steve Cannon, ed.s, Popular Music in France from Chanson to Techno: Culture, Identity, and Society (Burlington, 
VA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 34; Chris Warne, “Bringing Counterculture to France: Actuel Magazine 
and the Legacy of May ’68,” Modern & Contemporary France 15, no. 3 (August 2007): 309-324.   
12 Alain Spiraux, “Ce qu’ils pensent de la ‘révolution’ des jeunes,” Noir et blanc, no. 1213, June 27-July 3, 
1968, 7-9. 
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that she was “neither a suffragette nor a militant” and refused to take a public position.13 Some 
went even further. France Gall noted that what had started out as “a certain irritation” eventually 
escalated to a level that scared her. “But today,” she continued, “I am completely reassured. 
Everything has returned to order. What happiness!”14 Frank Alamo went so far as to say that 
“fortunately,” after all of the commotion, “General de Gaulle has proven himself up to the task. 
He was the strongest and he showed it.”15 The presse des jeunes reacted similarly. The July 1968 
issue of Salut les copains, for instance, featured no mention of the near-revolution the month 
prior. It contented itself with coverage of Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie Vartan’s tour and vacation 
of South America and Claude François’ travels to Africa.16 In the May issue, meanwhile, only 
André Arnaud, the magazine’s resident news and opinion columnist, mentioned the nationwide 
protests. His column featured a certain level of sympathy for the plight of the student protesters, 
but Arnaud made sure to couple it with admonishment for the “agitators” whose only aim, he 
averred, was to cause chaos. Throughout the article, Arnaud sternly reminded his readers that a 
noble goal is easily corrupted by vandalism and ill-directed anger.17      
In an analysis the following year, the sociologist and social commentator Edgar Morin 
found that the rise of mass culture and mass consumption in a society of leisure and affluence 
allowed for the creation of two distinct categories of youth. On the “right wing” he identified a 
youth culture that was “almost entirely integrated and integrationist, with its cult of the stars (fan 
clubs, autographed photos, almost total absence of dissonance)” typified by the yé-yé popular 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 8.  
14 Ibid., 7.  
15 Ibid., 8.  
16 Salut les copains, June 1968.  
17 André Arnaud, “Copains-flashes,” Salut les copains, May 1968, 28, 31.  
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culture. Among the “left wing,” Morin observed a youth culture where “consummation took 
priority over consumption, where one is very close to violence, to marijuana, to LSD, to the 
denunciation of official values, to political contestation.”18       
What was the legacy of yé-yé? Certainly, from a musical standpoint, its enduring impact 
was limited; it never gained the critical praise that other genres like jazz or the chanson 
française, did, and it was only once popular music musicians began crafting songs in contrast to 
the “mainstream” yé-yé sound that the Anglo-American musical style gained a legitimacy of its 
own in France.19 The genre nevertheless deserves credit for adapting American-influenced 
popular musical styles into an original French alternative. As this thesis has suggested all along, 
though, yé-yé’s impact extended far beyond its musical contributions. Through its sheer 
magnitude and popularity, the popular culture found itself well-positioned to define what it 
meant to be young in mid-1960s France, and in doing so offered a cohesive image of 
adolescence that fully embraced the broader goals of a decolonized France.  
Taken further, in defining youth, the popular culture also, on some level, articulated a 
vision of modern France. It accepted, if tacitly, the imperatives of economic and cultural 
modernization that preoccupied the intellectual and political elite of the era. Yé-yé provided a 
rational portrait of France’s transformation into a mass consumer society, one that, if its 
popularity was any indication, enjoyed a level of legitimacy and consensus. Its widespread 
acceptance marked a departure from the era of the blousons noirs only a few short years prior, 
when the idea of youth consumerism stoked exaggerated fears about the erosion of France’s 
                                                 
18 Edgar Morin, “Culture adolescente et révolte étudiante,” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 24, no. 3 
(May-June 1969): 767.  
19 This is an argument put forth by David Looseley. See Looseley, "In from the margins,” 27-39.  
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identity amid the twin threats of modernization and “Americanization.” At the same time, the 
archetypical copain, as defined discursively, implied both an urban and increasingly educated 
existence as integral to the modern adolescent experience. Such a representation lent a cultural 
coherence to the social and economic changes underway at the time. It reflected the 
democratization and expansion of secondary and higher education, an undertaking deemed vital 
to France’s modernization efforts and its thrust towards swift technological advancement. 
Finally, if popular media representations were any indication, the copain culture also suggested 
an inherent whiteness, lending the appearance of (racial and ethnic) unity in the definition of 
“Frenchness” in the wake of decolonization, a definition that obscured France’s complex racial 
makeup and put the appearance of distance between “modern” France and its imperial past.      
Though the yé-yé phenomenon never had any direct affinity with the ruling Gaullists, it 
was nevertheless a product of the climate of conservatism and stability engendered by de Gaulle 
and his contemporaries. Coming on the heels of an half century of uninterrupted crises (two 
world wars followed by a succession of colonial wars, periods of economic hardship as well as 
social and political turmoil), by the early 1960s the French public placed a premium on stability. 
Yé-yé helped serve that need, coupling its consumerist outlook with an apolitical social 
conservatism that emphasized traditional gender roles and sexual relationships. The popular 
culture helped usher in a period where the French public, unburdened by any major internal or 
external crisis, could enjoy the fruits of national prosperity. It was only once France became 
“bored,” to quote a prescient Le Monde article from spring 1968, that the world envisioned by 
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yé-yé lost its allure.20 For a baby boomer generation who had never known anything other than 
affluence and abundance, yé-yé’s promotion of apolitical leisure and consumption was no longer 
enough. Like de Gaulle, the popular music was deemed too conservative and too out of touch 
with the needs of France’s young generation. Their vociferous, if ultimately unrealized, rejection 
of what France had become – namely, a nation that had over a relatively brief span of time 
undergone a consumer revolution buttressed by far-reaching economic and technological change, 
while abandoning a global empire in favor of a strictly defined border on the European continent, 
all under de Gaulle’s paternalistic stewardship – underscored just how much France had changed 
(or was perceived to have changed). The yé-yé popular culture was vital to that perceived 
change, articulating a vision of modern France and youth’s role in it.   
 
  
                                                 
20 On March 15, 1968, Pierre Viansson-Ponté published an article in the daily newspaper Le Monde titled 
“France is bored.” It evidently captured a palpable feeling of frustration that would manifest itself less than two 
months later in the protests of May 1968. The article is mentioned in Charles G. Cogan, “The Break-up: General de 
Gaulle’s Separation from Power,” Journal of Contemporary History 27, no. 1 (Jan. 1992): 177. 
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